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INTRODUCTION
For people who study international trade law, these are exciting
times. The law that governs trade in goods and services across national
borders-what John Jackson once referred to as "the 'boilerroom' of
international relations" 3-has become a subject of intense scholarly and
popular interest.4 The reasons are not hard to perceive. The volume of
world trade has increased steadily since the end of the Second World
War, and has grown at an impressive rate throughout the 1990s. 5 The
last few years, moreover, have seen the inauguration of a comprehen-
sive new regime to govern world trade, the 134-member World Trade
Organization, or WTO.6 Quite simply, there is more international trade,
and more international trade law, than there used to be.7
3. John H. Jackson, International Economic Law: Reflections on the "Boilerroom" of
International Relations, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 595 (1995).
4. See, e.g., THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION (Philip Ruttley et al.
eds. 1998); Symposium, Institutions for International Economic Integration, 17 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 351 (1996-97); Symposium on Current Issues in the World Trade Organization,
17 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 69 (1996); Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 555, 555 (1996) (noting emergence of new
field of international economic law); see also Joel P. Trachtman, The International Economic
Law Revolution, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 33 (1996) (describing new perspectives on
international economic law); Trade Winds, ECONOMIST, Nov. 8, 1997, at 85 (noting that "the
movement of goods and services across national boundaries has become the subject of in-
tense public attention all over the world") [hereinafter Trade Winds].
5. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RE-
LATIONS 6 (3d ed. 1995) (noting "significant increases in volume of world trade" during the
postwar period); World Trade Growth Slower in 1998 After Unusually Strong Growth in
1997, Chart I (WTO Press Release of April 16, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/
wto/intltrad/internat.htm> (chart showing growth in volume of world merchandise exports in
years 1990-98) [hereinafter WTO Press Release]. World trade in merchandise now exceeds
five trillion dollars annually, id. at 1, roughly sixteen times its volume in 1950, Trade Winds,
supra note 4, and its rate of increase has substantially outpassed growth in world output over
the past decade. WTO Press Release, supra, at 2.
6. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Ne-
gotiations, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. The WTO was established in the final act of the
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, begun in Punta del Este, Uruguay in September 1986.
"The multilateral agreements reached" in the Uruguay Round "span over 400 pages, and the
negotiated tariff schedules and other market access commitments another 20,000 or so."
David W. Leebron, An Overview of the Uruguay Round Results, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. I1, 11 (1995). "Already, more than ninety percent of the world's trade in goods is con-
ducted in the shadow of the trade agreements" that make up the WTO's "organic
documents." Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 379, 381 (1996). For more
on the Uruguay Round, see infra note 65 and accompanying text. On the WTO's membership,
see The Organization: Members (last updated July 27, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/
about/organsn6.htm> [hereinafter Members].
7. Today's "new global economy" may be the resumption of a trend that began at the
end of the last century and was interrupted by the First World War. See Louis W. Pauly,
Capital Mobility, State Autonomy and Political Legitimacy, 48 J. INT'L AFF. 369, 371 (1995)
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One of the WTO's more remarkable and controversial innovations
is its mechanism for resolving trade disputes among member states. 8
Traditionally, states have resolved such disputes in "pragmatic" fashion,
through negotiation and compromise informed by the relative power of
the parties involved.9 But no longer:' ° the WTO's Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the DSU)
provides that disputes between member states are to be resolved in
(noting that "[c]onditions approximating what is now commonly, if hyperbolically, referred
to as 'global finance' existed before 1914 between the most advanced economies and their
dependencies").
8. The literature on dispute settlement in the WTO is voluminous. For some examples,
see DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (James Cameron & Karen
Campbell eds., 1998) [hereinafter DISPUTE RESOLUTION]; INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND
THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (Emst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW]; JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
107-37 (2d ed. 1997); Alan Stone Sweet, The New GATT: Dispute Resolution and Judiciali-
zation of the Trade Regime, in LAW ABOVE NATIONS 118 (Mary L. Volcansek ed. 1997)
[hereinafter LAW ABOVE NATIONS]; Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Pro-
cedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM J. INT'L L.
193 (1996); Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for
World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349, 373-92 (1995); Miquel MontafiA i Mora, A GATT
With Teeth: Law Wins Over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 31
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103 (1993); Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridiciza-
tion of International Trade Relations, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 775, 793-808 (1996-
1997); Reitz, supra note 4; G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations
Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829 (1995); Sympo-
sium, WTO Dispute Settlement System, I J. INT'L EcON. L. 175 (1998); see also Philip M.
Nichols, Realism, Liberalism, Values, and the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 851, 851 n.2 (1996) (collecting sources). For an important early discussion, see
Phillip R. Trimble, International Trade and the "Rule of Law," 83 MICH. L. REV. 1016,
1025-32 (1985) (book review).
9. See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 109-11 (contrasting "power-oriented" and "rule-
oriented" approaches); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Trade Law and the
GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System 1948-1996: An Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW, supra note 8, at 5, 30 (contrasting "diplomatic" and "legal" approaches to set-
tling international trade disputes); Shell, supra note 8, at 833-34 (contrasting "pragmatism"
and "legalism" in international trade law); cf. OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN
THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 76 (1985) ("The development of an understand-
ing between the parties-of a mutually acceptable solution-[was] the main objective of the
[former] dispute settlement procedure.").
10. See Shell, supra note 8, at 833 (WTO's "new international dispute resolution system
marks a dramatic departure from past international trade practice"); see also Robert A.
Green, Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving Disputes Between Governments: A Compari-
son of the International Tax and Trade Regimes, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 79, 82 (1998) (trade
dispute settlement procedures "have evolved, particularly in recent years, into a highly le-
galistic system"); Sweet, supra note 8, at 118 (WTO procedures have evolved "from state-to-
state bargaining to supranational adjudication"); Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in
the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAW. 389, 396 (1995)
(Uruguay Round's reforms "on dispute resolution must be judged as a decisive, though im-
perfect, step in the direction of a more legalistic, adjudicatory process").
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adversary proceedings before impartial panels of experts." Under the
DSU, panels have authority to decide whether members' laws violate
international trade norms; panel decisions are essentially binding, 12
though there is a right of appeal to a newly-established Appellate Body
within the WTO. 3 If an offending party in a dispute fails to implement a
final decision, the complaining party may seek compensation from it.'
4
If the parties cannot agree on the appropriate level of compensation, the
complaining party may retaliate by suspending trade concessions it has
made to the offending party. 5
The WTO's turn to "trade legalism" has sparked a heated debate.'
6
Some commentators favor the new approach, praising its predictability,
11. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, arts. 6, 8, 33 I.L.M. 1226
[hereinafter DSU]. There is a requirement that the members attempt to settle their dispute by
consultation before reaching the panel stage. Id. art. 4, 33 I.L.M. 1228-29; JACKSON ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 341. On the adversarial nature of the dispute-settlement mechanism, see
Montafih i Mora, supra note 8, at 161.
12. A panel report is adopted unless there develops a consensus against its adoption in
the WTO. See DSU art. 16(4), 33 I.L.M. 1235; JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 343. For
more on the significance of this "reverse consensus" requirement, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 74-79.
13. DSU, art. 17, 33 I.L.M. 1236. The Appellate Body's report is binding unless there
develops a consensus against its adoption in the WTO. Id. art. 17 (14), 33 I.L.M. 1237.
14. JACKSON ET. AL., supra note 5, at 343-44; Dillon, supra note 8, at 386-87.
15. See Dillon, supra note 8, at 387. For a more complete description of the WTO's dis-
pute-settlement mechanism, see infra text accompanying notes 66-91.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) contains a similar adjudicative
mechanism for resolving some disputes, though its approach is less adversarial and omits
appellate review. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-
U.S., ch. 20, 32 I.L.M. 693; see also Gabrielle Marceau, The Dispute Settlement Rules of the
North American Free Trade Agreement: A Thematic Comparison with the Dispute Settlement
Rules of the World Trade Organization, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 8, at
487, 541-42; Samuel C. Straight, Note, GATF and NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute Set-
tlement and the Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45 DUKE L.J. 216, 220, 231 (1995); cf
Nobuo Kiriyama, Institutional Evolution in Economic Integration: A Contribution to Com-
parative Institutional Analysis for International Economic Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 53, 68-69 (1998) (arguing that NAFTA's process is more open to political interfer-
ence and less legalistic than WTO's). See generally David A. Gantz, Dispute Settlement
Under the NAFTA and the WTO: Choice of Forum Opportunities and Risks For the NAFTA
Parties, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1025, 1083-91 (1999) (comparing dispute settlement under
NAFTA and WTO). For other interesting discussions of dispute settlement under NAFTA,
see David S. Huntington, Settling Disputes under the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 407 (1993); David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA:
Lessons from the Early Experience, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 163 (1997).
16. See William R. Sprance, The World Trade Organization and United States' Sover-
eignty: The Political and Procedural Realities of the System, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1225,
1226-27 (1998); see also Shell, supra note 8, at 833 (noting "running debate" between trade
"legalists" and "pragmatists" on the question of dispute resolution).
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uniformity, and fairness. 7 The DSU, they argue, will promote compli-
ance with international trade norms by rendering dispute settlement
more effective. 8 Others contend that the new approach will lead to a
loss of national sovereignty and democratic self-government.' 9 The
WTO's critics point to a consolidation of power in the hands of unac-
countable trade panelists, a consolidation made particularly dangerous
by the secretive nature of the panel process and the seemingly inexora-
ble expansion of trade law into non-trade areas. 20 On one thing, both
17. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 8, at 111; Montafi i Mora, supra note 8, at 178;
Young, supra note 10, at 390-91.
18. See, e.g., MontafiA i Mora, supra note 8, at 179-80; Young, supra note 10, at 390-
91, 409; Glen T. Schleyer, Note, Power to the People: Allowing Private Parties to Raise
Claims Before the WTO Dispute Resolution System, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2275, 2291 (1997);
Shell, supra note 8, at 900.
19. See, e.g., Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 1, at 240-41 (statement of Ralph
Nader); Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International Institutions, and the Erosion of
National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1944, 1944-45, 1948 (1997) (book
review); Trimble, supra note 8, at 1025-29; Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure
Seriously: Reflections on the Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 1221, 1267 n.156 (1995); see also Jeffrey Atik, Identifying Antidemocratic Out-
comes: Authenticity, Self-Sacrifice, and International Trade, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L.
229, 236-37 (1998) (discussing democratic critiques of WTO). Even some trade legalists
have raised concerns. Nichols, for example, believes that the "new rigidity" of the WTO's
dispute-resolution system is "largely beneficial," but fears that its disregard of societal val-
ues may diminish public support for the organization. Philip M. Nichols, Extension of
Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 295, 300 (1996); Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U.L.
REV. 658, 659-61 (1996) [hereinafter Nichols, Trade Without Values]. Shell also supports
trade legalism, but believes that broader public participation would enhance the legitimacy
of the WTO's dispute-settlement process.'Shell, supra note 8, at 837-39, 907-11; G. Richard
Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by Nonstate Parties in the World
Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 359, 359-70 (1996); cf Andrea K. Schnei-
der, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Individual Rights in International Trade
Organizations, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 587, 589 (1998) (arguing that broader public
participation in dispute settlement would increase the democratic legitimacy of international
trade organizations).
20. See Atik, supra note 19, at 236-37; Trimble, supra note 8, at 1029 ("In my view the
value of representative government outweighs the value of free trade."). On the secretive
nature of trade adjudication, see Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 1, at 247 (statement of
Ralph Nader); Kenneth W. Abbott, "Economic" Issues and Political Participation: The
Evolving Boundaries of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 971, 1005 n.168
(1996); Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World
Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 331, 333-34 (1996); Robert F. Housman,
Democratizing International Trade Decision-making, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699, 713-14,
722 (1994). On the expansion of trade law into non-trade areas, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff,
"Trade and": Recent Developments in Trade Policy and Scholarship-And Their Surprising
Political Implications, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 759, 762-68 (1996-97); Green, supra note
10, at 132; Philip M. Nichols, Corruption in the World Trade Organization: Discerning the
Limits of the World Trade Organization's Authority, 28 INT'L L. & POL. 711, 715-19
(1996); Nichols, Trade Without Values, supra note 19, at 672-90; Aubry D. Smith, Note,
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sides agree: supporters and opponents alike believe that WTO rulings
will have a profound impact on the policies of member states.
To students of American constitutional history, the debate over the
WTO has a familiar ring. We take it for granted today that the United
States Supreme Court has authority to review the judgments of state
courts on questions of federal law.2' In the first half of the nineteenth
century, though, the Court's assertion of appellate jurisdiction over state
courts caused great controversy.22 Antebellum Americans debated the
merits of Supreme Court review in a manner remarkably similar to the
way in which today's Americans debate the merits of the WTO. The
Court's supporters-people like Joseph Story, John Marshall, and Dan-
iel Webster-asserted that its review of state court judgments promoted
uniformity, predictability, and compliance with federal norms.23 Its op-
ponents-people like Spencer Roane, Robert Hayne, and John C.
Calhoun-contended that Supreme Court review posed dangers for state
24sovereignty and representative democracy. To its opponents, in Jeffer-
son's words, the Court seemed an "instrument which, working like
gravity" would obliterate the states and "press us at last into one con-
solidated mass. 25
This article explores the nineteenth-century conflict over Supreme
Court review and discusses its implications for today's debate on the
WTO.2 Congress granted the Court appellate jurisdiction over state
Executive-Branch Rulemaking and Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: A
Proposal To Increase Public Participation, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1267, 1271-73 (1996).
21. See 16B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
4006 (2d ed. 1996). The present statutory authorization is at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1994).
22. The classic work on the controversy remains Charles Warren's two-part history of
the Court. CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (rev. ed.
1926). Other good sources include Louis B. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY (1932);
CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
AND POLITICS 1789-1835 (1944); DWIGHT WILEY JESSUP, REACTION AND ACCOMMODATION:
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 1809-1835 (1987); Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial
Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 390-413 (1998); Leslie Friedman Goldstein, State Re-
sistance to Authority in Federal Unions: The Early United States (1790-1860) and the
European Community (1958-94), 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 149 (1997); Charles Warren,
Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United States-A History of the
Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act (pts. I & 2), 47 AM. L. REV. 1, 47 AM. L. REV. 161
(1913).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 169-177 (discussing arguments of Story), 190-
93 (discussing arguments of Marshall), 230-33 (discussing arguments of Webster).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 196-202 (discussing arguments of Roane), 234-
37 (discussing arguments of Hayne), 249-54 (discussing arguments of Calhoun).
25. Jefferson Letter, supra note 2, at 196.
26. Cf Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part
One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 845, 861 (1999) (suggesting analogy between
WTO and Marshall Court).
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courts in one of its earliest pieces of legislation, the Judiciary Act of
1789.27 The first serious challenge to that jurisdiction occurred about a
quarter-century later, however, in connection with the Court's famous
opinion in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.28 The conflict continued episodi-
cally for the next four decades, with several states refusing to
acknowledge the Court's jurisdiction in particular cases,29 and ended
only with the Civil War, which resolved this and other questions of
American federalism by force.3°
The American experience suggests that today's debate overesti-
mates the likely impact the WTO will have on member states. As we
shall see, a number of factors favored the success of Supreme Court re-
view. The Court asserted jurisdiction over states in conformity with an
express statutory grant.31 It asserted jurisdiction under a Constitution
that established it as part of a new national government, one with sig-
nificant regulatory authority. The Court asserted jurisdiction over
states, finally, in the context of a relatively homogeneous society. While
there were regional differences, Americans in the early nineteenth cen-
tury shared much in the way of a common political and legal culture.33
Notwithstanding all these factors, the Court found it impossible,
over a period spanning more than forty years, to establish its authority
over recalcitrant states. While states accepted the Court's judgments
most of the time, they did not hesitate to defy it where they believed that
vital interests were at stake.3" And the WTO stands in a much weaker
position than the Court did in the early nineteenth century. No legisla-
tion grants the WTO jurisdiction over national courts.35 As we shall see,
the DSU does not require members to conform to WTO rulings; what-
ever the WTO decides, national courts remain free to apply national
27. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87; see HAINES, supra note 22, at 120.
For more on the Judiciary Act of 1789, see infra text accompanying notes 149-152.
28. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816). For more on the history of Supreme Court review
before Martin, see infra note 152 and accompanying text.
29. See Warren (pt.1), supra note 22, at 3-4; see also I BOUDIN, supra note 22, at 464-
66, 476-83; Friedman, supra note 22, at 382, 394-97; Goldstein, supra note 22, at 151, 153,
159-66. The states included California, Georgia, Kentucky, Ohio, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
Warren (pt. 1), supra note 22, at 4.
30. See Goldstein, supra note 22, at 155, 166; see also infra text accompanying notes
293-297. As the Georgia Supreme Court observed in 1890, "[a]fter [a] State has yielded to
the federal army, it can well afford to yield to the federal judiciary." Wrought Iron Range
Co. v. Johnson, 11 S.E. 233, 235 (Ga. 1890).
3 1. See infra text accompanying notes 300-301.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 302-305.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 306-310.
34. See Goldstein, supra note 22, at 152, 155-56, 166.
35. Indeed, United States law denies effect to WTO rulings that are "inconsistent with
any law of the United States." Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1). For
further discussion, see infra note 91 and accompanying text.
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law.36 Unlike the Court, the WTO does not act as part of a new govern-
ment. The instrument that establishes the WTO is not a constitution, but
a trade treaty with a specific provision for withdrawal.37 WTO members,
finally, share little in the way of a common culture or history. 8
If the antebellum Court could not keep states of the union in line de-
spite the many factors working in its favor, it seems unlikely that the
WTO, which has none of the advantages the Court enjoyed, will be able
to dominate its member states. To be sure, WTO members may have
incentives to implement rulings in many cases.39 Just as states did,
members may decide that compliance is the best policy, much of the
time. But the nineteenth-century conflict suggests that WTO members
will not hesitate to defy adverse rulings where they believe that vital
national interests are at stake. In those circumstances, as Hudec has re-
cently observed, the WTO "will have to learn to cope with legal
failure."4"
Part I of this article describes the DSU and examines the arguments
of supporters and critics.4' Part II explores the nineteenth-century con-
troversy over Supreme Court review. It focuses on three important
episodes: the conflict with Virginia in connection with Martin and Co-
hens v. Virginia;42 the conflict with Georgia in connection with the
Cherokee cases 3-a conflict that served as backdrop for some extraor-
dinary congressional debates on the Court's jurisdiction; ' and the
conflict with Wisconsin in connection with Abelman v. Booth.4 1 Part III
discusses the implications of the nineteenth-century controversy for to-
day's debate.46
36. See infra text accompanying notes 315-317..
37. See infra text accompanying notes 318-322.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 323-325.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 117-121, 329.
40. Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the
First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 14 (1999).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 66-142.
42. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 82, 264 (1821). See infra text accompanying notes 153-208.
43. See e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). See infra text accompa-
nying notes 210-225, 244-245.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 226-238 (discussing Webster-Hayne debate),
239-242, 246-247 (discussing report of House Judiciary Committee recommending repeal
of Court's appellate jurisdiction over state courts).
45. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). See infra text accompanying notes 262-291.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 298-330.
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I. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WTO
A. The DSU
To understand the WTO's dispute-settlement procedures, and to ap-
preciate why they represent an important change for international tradeS 47
law, one must recall some history. The WTO, established in the Final
Act of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in 1994, 48 oversees the
operation of several international trade treaties, the most prominent of
which is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a multi-
lateral agreement that has been in effect, in one form or another, since
1947.49 GATT establishes a set of rules to govern trade among
"contracting parties," rules that constrain the parties from adopting
measures-like tariffs, quotas, and internal taxes-that burden imports
and distort the flow of goods across national borders. ° Disputes are in-
evitable, and article 23 of GATT provides that a party may seek redress
where it believes that its benefits under GATT are being "nullified or
impaired" as the result of another party's failure to carry out its GATT
obligations.5' If the parties cannot settle their differences by consultation,
47. See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 31; see also Philip M. Nichols, Forgotten Linkages-
Historical Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism and Analysis of the World
Trade Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 461, 490-92 (1998) (arguing that historical
analysis is of "critical importance" in understanding dispute settlement within the WTO).
48. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Ne-
gotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994). The Uruguay Round was the eighth and
most recent in a series of multilateral trade negotiations that have taken place under the aus-
pices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 314.
Although the Final Act was signed in April 1994, the WTO did not actually come into exis-
tence until the following year. Id. at 293; WORLD TRADE ORG., THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM 12 (1998). For more on the Uruguay Round, see Leebron, supra note 6.
For more on prior rounds, see JACKSON, supra note 8, at 73-78.
49. See Shell, supra note 8, at 832 & n.8; JACKSON, supra note 8, at 31; JACKSON ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 289-90. GATT has an interesting history. The treaty was originally con-
ceived as part of a larger project that included the establishment of an "International Trade
Organization," or ITO. Indeed, the contracting parties approved GATT in 1947 only
"provisionally," in anticipation that the ITO charter would be completed the following year.
JACKSON, supra note 8, at 39-40. The ITO charter was completed in 1948, but it failed to win
approval in the United States Senate; GATT became, "by default, the central organization for
coordinating national policies on international trade." JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 295;
see also Nichols, supra note 6, at 390. In 1994, a revised version of GATT, "GATT 1994,"
was appended as an annex to the new WTO charter. WTO Agreement, Annex IA, 33 I.L.M.
1154. "GATT 1994" incorporates the original "GAT' 1947," as amended, id.; in acceding to
the WTO charter, a country automatically becomes bound to "GATT 1994" as well. JACKSON
ET AL., supra note 5, at 292; see also Nichols, supra note 6, at 391-92. Thus, after almost a
half-century of "provisional" application, GATT finally has definitive status. JACKSON, su-
pra note 8, at 48.
50. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 290.
51. GATT art. 23(1). A party may also seek redress where it believes that its benefits
are being nullified or impaired by conduct of another party that is not itself a GATT
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article 23 provides, the dispute may be referred to the GATT member-
ship, which shall investigate and make recommendations or rulings "as
appropriate. 5 2 If the matter is "serious enough to justify such action,"
the membership may authorize the complaining party to suspend con-
cessions it has made under GATT to the offending party."3
These fairly sketchy provisions formed the basis for what became
established practice with regard to dispute settlement under GATT.5 4 If
consultations failed to resolve a dispute, the complaining party would
file a written complaint against the offending party with the GATT
membership.55 On the basis of that complaint, GATT's Director General
would appoint a panel to investigate the matter.56 A GATT panel usually
comprised three to five members chosen from national delegations;
panel members were to act in an impartial manner, free from national
allegiance. 7 After hearing argument and reviewing written submissions,
the panel would deliberate for "an unspecified period of time" and issue
a report recommending action by the GATT membership.58 A panel's
report had effect only if adopted by the membership-and the member-
ship acted by consensus. As a result, any party, including the party that
had lost the decision, could block adoption by opposing the panel's re-
port.6
In actuality, losing parties only rarely decided to block panel re-
ports.6' The fact that they could do so, however, led to serious delays in
violation. Id. Such "non-violation" cases are rare. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 362; see
also id. at 349, 357-64 (discussing non-violation cases). For more on non-violation cases,
see, for example, Thomas Cottier & Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, Non-Violation Com-
plaints in WTO/GATI Dispute Settlement: Past, Present and Future, in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW, supra note 8, at 145; Sung-joon Cho, GATT Non-Violation Issues in the WTO
Framework: Are They the Achilles' Heel of the Dispute Settlement Process?, 39 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 311 (1998).
52. GATT art. 23(2).
53. Id.
54. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 392-97; Schleyer, supra note 18, at 2282. For an ac-
count of the evolution of the GATT dispute-settlement procedures, see ROBERT E. HUDEC,
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (1993).
55. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 395.
56. Id.
57. Id. There was apparently a preference for three-member panels, which were thought
easier to manage. Pierre Pescatore, The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism-Its Present
Situation and Its Prospects, J. INT'L ARB., March 1993, at 27, 29.
58. Nichols, supra note 6, at 396; Schleyer, supra note 18, at 2283.
59. Nichols, supra note 6, at 396-97; see also Pescatore, supra note 57, at 35.
60. Nichols, supra note 6, at 397; Schleyer, supra note 18, at 2283.
61. Nichols, supra note 6, at 397, 399; Norio Komuro, The WTO Dispute Settlement
Mechanism: Coverage and Procedures of the WTO Understanding, J. WORLD TRADE,
August 1995, at 5, 29. As Shell explains, "relational pressures within the world trading
community and the flexible nature of GATT compliance processes led to mutually accept-
able solutions to trade problems in most cases." Shell, supra note 8, at 842 n.56. Hudec's
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the dispute-settlement process.62 Critics complained, moreover, about
frequent defects in panel decisions63 and a general failure on the part of
the membership to enforce sanctions against offending parties.' Ac-
cordingly, when trade negotiators established a new organization to
oversee the operation of GATT in the Uruguay Round-the WTO-
they also made a number of significant reforms in the dispute-settlement
61process. Specifically, they adopted a new "legalistic" method for re-
solving disputes among member states.
Disputes are now governed by the DSU, which supplements the
provisions of article 23.66 Some aspects are familiar. Just as before, a
complaining party must consult with the offending party before seeking
appointment of a panel.67 There is now a time limit, though: if consulta-
tions fail to resolve a dispute within sixty days, the complaining party
61has a right to the establishment of a panel to hear its case. Just as
famous study put the "overall success rate" of the GATT dispute-settlement process at 88
percent. HUDEC, supra note 54, at 353.
62. William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51, 85, 90
(1987); JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 343; see also Komuro, supra note 61, at 29 (noting
that "[sleveral" panel reports were "shelved ... because of an objection by the disputing
parties under the consensus rule"); Freidl Weiss, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Economic
Order of WTO Member States, in CHALLENGES TO THE NEW WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
77, 83 (Pitou van Dijck and Gerrit Faber eds., 1996) (arguing that consensus requirement,
which allowed parties to block adoption of panel reports, "caused considerable delay").
63. See Davey, supra note 62, at 88-89.
64. See id. at 85-88; Komuro, supra note 61, at 33. Indeed, in the entire history of
GATT, the membership authorized retaliation only once, in response to a complaint the
Netherlands had brought against the United States in 1953. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 116 &
n.36; Schleyer, supra note 18, at 2284. The Netherlands decided not to act on the authoriza-
tion. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 116.
65. See Shell, supra note 8, at 845-48. Shell explains that reform was the "unexpected"
result of a convergence of four interests at the close of the Uruguay Round, id. at 845: (1) the
general desire on the part of GATT members to curtail trade unilateralism, id. at 845; (2) an
impulse for reform "within the elite community of GATT professional participants," id. at
846; (3) a change in position on the part of European members, who had traditionally op-
posed an adjudicative approach, id. at 847; and (4) the decision by developing countries to
support an adjudicative approach, id. at 848. For another interesting description of the cir-
cumstances leading to reform, see Hudec, supra note 40, at 12-14.
66. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
[hereinafter DSU], Annex 2, WTO Agreement, 33 I.L.M. 1226. The DSU provides a "unified
dispute-settlement system for all parts of the GATT/WTO system." JACKSON, supra note 8,
at 125; see also Leebron, supra note 6, at 16 (discussing "integrated dispute settlement"
under DSU). Earlier practice contemplated different proceedures for different types of dis-
putes. Id.; see also Shell, supra note 8, at 848 (discussing potential for "forum-shopping"
under former rules).
67. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 340-41; see also supra text accompanying
note 52 (discussing consultation requirement under GATT article 23). Provisions with re-
spect to consultations are set forth in article four of the DSU. DSU art. 4, 33 I.L.M. 1228-29.
68. DSU art. 4(7), 33 I.L.M. 1229, art. 6(1), 33 I.L.M. 1230. The membership may de-
cide by consensus not to establish a panel, id. art. 6(1), 33 I.L.M. 1230, though this would
Summer 1999]
Michigan Journal of International Law
before, a panel comprises three or five members who serve in their indi-
vidual capacities;69 just as before, panel deliberations are confidential
and opinions anonymous. 70 Time limits now ensure, however, that a
panel's report will issue on schedule, normally six to eight months after
the panel's appointment.7 Once a panel report issues, it circulates to the
WTO membership-constituted, for these purposes, as the Dispute Set-
tlement Body (DSB)-for adoption.72
At this point, the DSU departs dramatically from past practice. Un-
like the old system, which provided for adoption of a panel report by
consensus,73 the DSU provides that a panel report will be adopted unless
the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt it.74 Assuming that a winning
party will not block a decision in its favor, this "reverse consensus" re-
quirement assures automatic adoption of a panel report.75 Automatic, at
least, in the absence of an appeal: the DSU establishes a new seven-
member Appellate Body to review panel decisions. 6 The Appellate
Body, whose members must be "unaffiliated with any government," 7
has authority to decide "issues of law" and "legal interpretation[]"
raised by a panel report.78 Like a panel report, an appellate report is
subject to a reverse consensus rule: an appellate report is adopted unless
the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt it.79
require the consent of the party that requested the panel in the first place. See JACKSON ET
AL., supra note 5, at 341-42 (explaining how this amounts "effectively" to a right to a
panel).
69. DSU art. 8(5), 33 I.L.M. 1231, art. 8(9), 33 I.L.M. 1232. The Secretariat nominates
panel members, and the parties "shall not oppose nominations except for compelling rea-
sons." Id. art. 8(6), 33 I.L.M. 1231; see also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 342
(describing selection process).
70. DSU art. 14, 33 I.L.M. 1235; JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 342. The secrecy sur-
rounding panel proceedings has been controversial. See infra text accompanying notes 132-
137.
71. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 342. The parties have a chance to comment on an
interim version of a panel report before it becomes final. DSU art. 15, 33 I.L.M. 1235.
72. On the identity of the WTO membership and the DSB, see WTO Agreement art.
4(2)-(3), 33 I.L.M. 1145; Shell, supra note 8, at 849 n.95. On the circulation of reports to the
DSB, see DSU art. 16, 33 I.L.M. 1235.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
74. DSU art. 16(4), 33 I.L.M. 1235; Shell, supra note 8, at 849.
75. See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 125; Green, supra note 10, at 84-85; Shell, supra
note 8, at 849.
76. DSU art. 17, 33 I.L.M. 1236. Members are appointed by the DSB for four-year
terms; each member may be reappointed once. Id. art 17(2), 33 I.L.M. 1236.
77. Id. art. 17(3), 33 I.L.M. 1236.
78. Id. art. 17(6), 33 I.L.M. 1236 ("An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered
in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel"); Shell, supra note 8, at
850.
79. DSU art. 17(14), 33 I.L.M. 1237; JACKSON, supra note 8, at 125; Green, supra note
10, at 85. The DSU contemplates that the length of time from appointment of a panel to
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Once the DSB adopts a final report, there remains the matter of im-
plementation. If a panel believes that a party has violated a provision of
GATT, its report will usually recommend that the party cease the viola-
tion, for example, "by withdrawing the offending measure.,,80 The DSU
provides that the offending party must comply with such a ruling within
a reasonable time, normally not to exceed fifteen months;8' if the com-
plaining party questions the adequacy of the offending party's response,
it may return to the original panel for a second ruling.82 Ultimately, if
the offending party fails to comply with a ruling, it must enter into ne-
gotiations with the complaining party "with a view to developing
mutually acceptable compensation."83 If these negotiations fail, the
complaining party may request authority to retaliate by suspending its
own GATT obligations to the offending party.' Authority is conferred
automatically-unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the re-
quest.
85
The DSU contemplates that members will implement adverse rul-
• 86
ings. Whether members must do so is a controversial question,
however.87 The DSU does not expressly require members to conform to
adoption of an appellate report will not exceed twelve months in the usual case. See DSU art.
20, 33 I.L.M. 1237-38.
80. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 343.
81. DSU art. 21, 33 I.L.M. 1238; JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 344. "The reasonable
period of time may be set by the member concerned if approved by the DSB, by agreement
of the contending parties, or, absent agreement, by arbitration." Id.
82. See DSU art. 21(5), 33 I.L.M. 1238; see also Green, supra note 10, at 85; Shell, su-
pra note 8, at 851. "The panel shall circulate its report within 90 days after the date of
referral of the matter to it." DSU art. 21(5), 33 I.L.M. 1238.
83. Id. art. 22(2), 33 I.L.M. 1239.
84. Id. The complaining party may request such authority "[iuf no satisfactory compen-
sation has been agreed within 20 days after the date of expiry of the reasonable period of
time" set for compliance with the final report. Id.
85. Id. art. 22(6); JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 344.
86. See DSU art. 21(1), 33 I.L.M. 1238 ("Prompt compliance with recommendations or
rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the bene-
fit of all Members."); DSU art. 22(1), 33 I.L.M. 1239 ("Compensation and the suspension of
concessions or other obligations are temporary measures available in the event that the rec-
ommendations and rulings are not implemented within a reasonable period of time."); John
H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstandings on the Nature
of Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 62-63 (1997). The WTO Agreement provides
that "[e]ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative
procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements," WTO Agreement
art. 16(4), 33 I.L.M. 1152, but leaves open the question what those obligations are. Jackson,
supra, at 62 n.9.
87. Jackson argues that members have an obligation to implement adverse rulings.
Jackson, supra note 86, at 61, 63-64; see also John H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty
Debate: United States Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results, 36
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 157, 180 (1997). Others contend that no such obligation exists.
See Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less Is More, 90 AM.
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WTO rulings,88 and so far members have been unwilling to grant them
direct effect in national courts. 9 As a result, in the absence of domestic
implementing legislation, national courts may continue to apply national
laws, whatever the WTO holds with regard to their GATT-legality. 90 For
purposes of the United States, this is made clear by section 102 of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which expressly denies effect to any
GATT provision, or the application of any GATT provision, that is in-
consistent with United States law. 9'
J. INT'L L. 416, 416-17 (1996); Timothy M. Reif & Marjorie Florestal, Revenge of the Push-
Me, Pull-You: The Implementation Process Under the WTO Dispute Settlement Under-
standing, 32 INT'L LAW. 755, 763 (1998). For more on the controversy over members'
obligation to implement rulings, see Bhala, supra note 26, at 861-62 & n.42; Comments,
Performance of the System IV: Implementation, 32 INT'L LAW. 789 (1998).
88. See Jackson, supra note 86, at 62; see also Debra Herz, Note, Effects of Interna-
tional Arbitral Tribunals in National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 217, 247 (1995-
96) (noting that the DSU "does not mandate enforcement of its ... decisions in national
courts"). Apparently, "[t]he relationship between national and international dispute resolu-
tion bodies was not a prominent issue in the Uruguay Round debates," Meinhard Hilf, The
Role of National Courts in International Trade Relations, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 321, 323
(1997), though some of the negotiators mistakenly believed that they had settled the ques-
tion. See Jackson, supra note 86, at 62.
89. See Ronald A. Brand, Direct Effect of International Economic Law in the United
States and the European Union, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 556, 559 (1996-97); Hilf, supra
note 88, at 336, 337; Shell, supra note 8, at 865 n.170; C. O'Neal Taylor, The Limits of Eco-
nomic Power: Section 301 and the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System, 30
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209, 298 n.410 (1997). In the United States, the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act makes clear that adverse rulings lack effect in domestic courts. See infra
note 91 and accompanying text. In the European Union, the EC Council and Commission
have both denied that the Uruguay Round agreements have direct effect; the European Court
of Justice has not yet ruled on the question, though it did hold recently that provisions of the
old GATT lacked such effect. See Peter L.H. Van den Bossche, The European Community
and the Uruguay Round Agreements, in IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND 23, 92-95
(John H. Jackson & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 1997) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY
ROUND]; Thomas Oppermann & Jose Christian Cascante, Dispute Settlement in the EC:
Lessons for the GATF/WTO Dispute Settlement System?, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW,
supra note 8, at 469, 482-84. On the situation in Japan, see Yuji Iwasawa, Constitutional
Problems Involved in Implementing the Uruguay Round in Japan, in IMPLEMENTING THE
URUGUAY ROUND, supra, at 137, 162 ("It is doubtful ... that Japanese courts would use
panel reports as delineating binding standards for the interpretation of the WTO Agreement,
and invalidate trade restrictions imposed by Japanese laws.").
90. See Atik, supra note 19, at 232.
91. In part, section 102 provides:
No provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of any
such provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of
the United States shall have effect.
19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(l). Section 102 also prohibits challenges to government conduct on the
ground that the conduct violates WTO obligations. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1)(B). For more on
the absence of direct effect under United States law, see JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at
306; David W. Leebron, Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results in the United States,
in IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 89, at 175, 218, 222.
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The DSU has been in effect for roughly five years now, and many
92have hailed it as a great success. In some respects, the praise seems
justified. Members have demonstrated confidence in the new system by
submitting cases at a greatly increased rate.93 While many of these have
settled, 94 the DSB has adopted several panel and appellate reports.95 In
two significant cases, moreover, the DSB has authorized retaliation for
members' failure to comply with adverse rulings. 96 In April 1999, as a
result of the failure of the EC to implement a ruling on its banana-
import regime, the DSB authorized the United States to suspend conces-
sions to the EC in the amount of $191 million.97 A few months later, the
DSB authorized the United States to suspend concessions to the EC in
the amount of $117 million in response to Europe's failure to implement
a ruling on hormone-treated meat.98 The DSB had ruled that Europe's
92. See, e.g., Bhala, supra note 26, at 856-59 (describing "cheerleading" by the DSU's
advocates); Debra P. Steger & Susan M. Hainsworth, New Directions in International Trade
Law: WTO Dispute Settlement, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 8, at 28, 57. ("At this
stage of the WTO's existence, the dispute settlement system is a major success story.");
William J. Davey, Issues of WTO Dispute Settlement, 91 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 279, 281
(1997) ("[T]he WTO dispute settlement system seems well on its way to success .... );
Warren Lavorel, The World Trade Organization: Looking Ahead, 91 AM. Soc'¥ INT'L L.
PROC. 20, 23 (1997) (noting delegations' satisfaction with new dispute-settlement proce-
dures).
93. See Lavorel, supra note 92, at 23; Steger & Hainsworth, supra note 92, at 33. At
this writing, some 138 distinct matters have been brought before the WTO. Overview of the
State-of-Play of WTO Disputes I (last modified Sept. 1, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/
dispute/bulletin.htm> [hereinafter Overview]. The United States has been by far the most fre-
quent complainant, but smaller and developing nations are increasingly active. See Hudec,
supra note 40, at 22; Lavorel, supra note 92, at 23; Steger & Hainsworth, supra note 92, at 34.
94. "[M]ore cases are being settled ... prior to the release of a panel report than ever
before." Lavorel, supra note 92, at 23; see also Steger & Hainsworth, supra note 92, at 33;
cf. Hudec, supra note 40, at 26-27 (noting that smaller number of disputes have gone to
panels and led to panel reports than was the case under the old GAT7 system). The adjudi-
cative nature of the new dispute-settlement process has contributed to this development. See
John H. Jackson, Introduction and Overview, Symposium on the First Three Years of the
WTO Dispute Settlement System, 32 INT'L LAW. 613, 614 (1998); Steger & Hainsworth,
supra note 92, at 33-34.
95. See Overview, supra note 93, at 5-7, 26-32 (describing adopted reports).
96. See id. at 3 (discussing European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas (WT/DS27) and European Communities-Measures Affecting
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (WT/DS26 and WT/DS48)). The membership had
authorized retaliation only once during the entire history of the old GATT regime. See supra
note 64.
97. See Overview, supra note 93, at 3; see also European Communities-Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas-Recourse to Arbitration by the European
Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU (WT/DS27/ARB) (Apr. 9, 1999) (arbitrators'
report on level of suspension). For some background on the banana-import dispute, see
James M. Cooper, Spirits in the Material World: A Post-Modern Approach to United States
Trade Policy, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 957, 970-74 (1999); Reif & Florestal, supra note 87,
at 776-81.
98. See Overview, supra note 93, at 3.
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ban on such meat violated provisions of an agreement on sanitary and
phytosanitary measures.9
But there is reason for caution as well. As yet, relatively few dis-
putes have reached the implementation stage.'0 In those that have,
members have shown a willingness to resist adverse rulings where they
believe the stakes are sufficiently high.'0 ' In the banana-import dispute,
for example, authorization to retaliate came only after continued Euro-
pean stalling and a threat of unilateral action on the part of the United
States. O2 At this writing, it remains unclear whether the EC will revise
its import rules.0 3 In the hormones dispute, the EC has indicated that the
adverse WTO ruling-and the attendant sanctions-will not persuade it
to remove its ban on hormone-treated meat.'°4
The WTO may yet find ways to defuse such crises. Over time, as
Hudec has suggested, the organization may be able to "fashion[]...
accommodations that produce ... result[s] that can be said to be con-
sistent with long-term respect for GATT/WTO law."'0 5 As the banana-
imports and hormones cases make clear, however, dispute settlement in
the WTO has begun to trench on sensitive domestic policy concerns.106
As we shall see in part III, members may feel little need to comply with
99. See id. at 29. For background on the hormones dispute, see Dale E. McNiel, The
First Case Under the WTO's Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement: The European Union's
Hormone Ban, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 89 (1998); Reif & Florestal, supra note 87, at 781-84;
Vern R. Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming the "World Trans-Science Organiza-
tion": Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones
Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 251 (1998).
100. See Whitney Debevoise, Access to Documents and Panel and Appellate Body Ses-
sions: Practice and Suggestions For Greater Transparency, 32 INT'L LAW. 817, 829 (1998)
("To date, few disputes have entered the implementation phase, so it is too early to assess
whether the system encourages compliance with panel rulings and how well it handles cases
in which Members refuse to comply.").
101. See Reif & Florestal, supra note 87, at 756.
102. See id. at 776-81; Cooper, supra note 97, at 972-74; see also Helene Cooper, U.S.
Starts Its Threatened Banana Fight With Europe, WALL ST. J., March 4, 1999, at A2; David
E. Sanger, Miffed at Europe, U.S. Raises Tariffs For Luxury Goods, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
1999, at Al.
103. See Michael Smith, Bananas: EU Warns of Delay in Reforming Banana Import
Regime, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1999.
104. See Helene Cooper, U.S. Imposes 100% Tariffs on Slew of Gourmet Imports in
War Over Beef, WALL ST. J., July 20, 1999; see also Elizabeth Olson, U.S. and EU Trade
Shots in Beef War, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 4, 1999, at 13.
105. Hudec, supra note 40, at 15.
106. See At Daggers Drawn, EcONOMIST, May 8, 1999, at 17; see also Roundtable
Summary and Looking to the Future, 32 INT'L LAW. 943, 945 (1998).
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adverse rulings that affect what they perceive to be vital national inter-
ests. '07
B. The Debate on the DSU
The DSU has occasioned a heated debate. 18 Supporters and oppo-
nents agree that its adoption has profound implications for WTO
members. They disagree, though, on whether those implications are be-
nign or malignant. Supporters argue that the DSU will promote
rationality and fairness in the dispute-settlement process, thereby pro-
moting members' compliance with international trade norms." 9
Opponents, by contrast, contend that the DSU threatens to undermine
national sovereignty and democratic control over trade policy."0
Take first the arguments of the DSU's supporters. Supporters con-
tend that the DSU's legalistic approach will ensure uniformity and
predictability in the application of international trade rules."' As a re-
sult, nations will find it easier to forecast the consequences of trade
measures ' 2-a great improvement over the old GATT system, which
failed to provide much guidance for national decisionmakers." 3 In addi-
tion, supporters contend, the DSU will promote fairness, particularly
107. See infra text accompanying notes 315-328; see also Hudec, supra note 40, at 14-
15 (predicting that there will be cases in which members refuse to comply with WTO rul-
ings).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20. For further discussion of the debate,
see, for example, William J. Aceves, Lost Sovereignty? The Implications of the Uruguay
Round Agreements, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 427, 428-29 (1995); Barry Friedman, Valuing
Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 365-66 & nn. 209, 212 (1997); Zane 0. Gresham &
Thomas A. Bloomfield, Rhetoric or Reality: The Impact of the Uruguay Round Agreement
on Federal and State Environmental Laws, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1143, 1162-64 (1995);
Jackson, supra note 87, at 158 n.3, 162, 175-83; Straight, supra note 15, at 217-18, 233-34,
243-47, 250-53.
109. See infra text accompanying notes 111-121.
110. See infra text accompanying notes 122-137.
111. See, e.g., Croley & Jackson, supra note 8, at 193; Jackson, supra note 87, at 177-
78; Nichols, Trade Without Values, supra note 19, at 719; Kim Rubenstein & Jenny Schultz,
Bringing Law and Order to International Trade: Administrative Law Principles and the
GATT/WTO, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEG. COMM. 271, 305 (1996); Montafi i Mora, supra note 8,
at 178; Young, supra note 10, at 390. The DSU itself makes reference to these benefits. See
DSU art. 3(2), 33 I.L.M. 1227 ("The dispute settlement system ... is a central element in
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system.").
112. Predictability will also help firms plan and execute international transactions. See
Jackson, supra note 87, at 177-78; Nichols, Trade Without Values, supra note 19, at 659,
719; Schleyer, supra note 18, at 2291; see also Horacio A. Grigera Naon, Sovereignty and
Regionalism, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1073, 1081-82 (1996).
113. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE 394, 395 (1995); Weiss, supra note 62, at 83.
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with regard to complaints by smaller and developing countries." 4 As we
have seen, the old GATT system favored the more powerful party in a
dispute, which could stall the process, without serious fear of reprisal
from the weaker party, until it got its way."5 The DSU, by contrast,
tends to level the playing field. Whatever the relative power of the par-
ties, they can now expect a decision on the merits, and an authorization
to enforce that decision, within a determinable time."1
6
For these reasons, supporters contend, the DSU will encourage
members' compliance with international trade norms."7 Regular panel
reports will provide guidance for members that wish to conform to
GATT requirements; automatic adoption and enforcement of panel re-
ports will discourage members from trying to evade them."8 If panels do
their work fairly and efficiently, and build confidence in their decisions,
members will feel less need to resort to extralegal "self-help" measures
in resolving trade disputes." 9 Some supporters have argued, finally, that
the DSU will promote compliance by blunting pressures for protection
at home. 2' On this theory, governments will use adverse WTO rulings
as "cover" for the repeal of trade-distorting measures that remain popu-
lar with important domestic constituencies. 
2
These arguments fail to persuade the DSU's opponents. In their
view, the DSU represents a grave threat to national sovereignty and
democratic self-government. Opponents point to the potential for "bad
114. Jackson, supra note 87, at 161; Young, supra note 10, at 390. Indeed, developing
countries have been increasingly active under the DSU. See supra note 93.
115. See supra note 62 and accompanying text; cf Schleyer, supra note 18, at 2291
(noting that pragmatic approach "produce[d] ... outcomes based on the power balance of
the disputants at that point in history").
116. In this way, Jackson argues, smaller nations might find that membership in the
WTO actually enhances "'sovereignty.'" Jackson, supra note 87, at 161; see also Schleyer,
supra note 18, at 2292 (noting that an adjudicative method creates less temptation for a pow-
erful nation to "'flex [its] muscles' ") (alteration in original). During the debate on the WTO,
Clinton Administration officials made this claim with regard to the United States. See, e.g.,
The World Trade Organization: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
103d Cong. 8, 13, 17 (1994) (statement of Michael Kantor, United States Trade Representa-
tive) [hereinafter Ways and Means Hearing].
117. See Schleyer, supra note 18, at 2291; Young, supra note 10, at 390-91.
118. See Schleyer, supra note 18, at 2291.
119. See Montafi i Mora, supra note 8, at 134-35, 179; See also Naon, supra note 112,
at 1082; Young, supra note 10, at 390-91, 409. Indeed, a desire to curb American unilater-
alism was a major factor in convincing negotiators to adopt the DSU in the Uruguay Round.
See supra note 65.
120. See Montafi i Mora, supra note 8, at 135; Young, supra note 10, at 391.
121. See Naon, supra note 112, at 1081; Shell, supra note 8, at 900 & n.328. "Officials
may even be able to obtain some positive political payoff by expressing sympathy with the
request for protection and criticizing the rules." Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nation's
Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of International Trade, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 501, 522
(1985).
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results" in significant cases. '22 As the scope of trade law expands into
areas like environmental protection and national security, WTO panels
may well act to invalidate members' laws in "circumstances that ...
pose great danger to essential national objectives."''2 Members will have
no choice but to comply with adverse rulings, opponents argue.24 As a
result, the WTO will have achieved sovereign control over vital ques-
tions of domestic policy.' 2'
Moreover, opponents argue, allowing WTO panels to invalidate
domestic legislation poses grave dangers for representative democ-
racy. 12 To be sure, Americans are accustomed to the idea that unelected
judges can invalidate popularly-enacted legislation. 27 But those are
American judges applying American law. They do not answer directly
to the people, but they receive their commissions from the people's rep-
resentatives and apply a constitution that commands the continuing
consent of the governed.2 2 Trade panelists, by contrast-those "faceless,
unelected, unaccountable bureaucrats in Geneva" 29-lack even the at-
tenuated claim to popular authority that federal judges enjoy."1 Their
appointment, and the law they apply, are both much further removed
from citizens' control. As a result, opponents contend, WTO rulings
122. See Jackson, supra note 87, at 175 (discussing objections).
123. Id; see also supra note 20 (discussing expansion of trade law into other areas). For
an interesting discussion of the interplay between GATT and national security concerns, see
John Yoo, Federal Courts as Weapons of Foreign Policy: The Case of the Helms-Burton Act,
20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 747, 758-62 (1997).
124. See Sprance, supra note 16, at 1232-35 (discussing objections).
125. See JAMES GOLDSMITH, THE TRAP 38 (1995). Some legalists have argued that in
certain circumstances a panel should refrain from invalidating a national law that burdens
free trade in pursuit of some important "societal value." Nichols, Trade Without Values,
supra note 19, at 660-61. See also Atik, supra note 19, at 230, 261-62 (distinguishing
among "democracy" critiques of international trade regimes).
126. See, e.g., Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 1, at 240-41 (prepared statement
of Ralph Nader); Trimble, supra note 8, at 1018, 1029-30; Trimble, supra note 19, at 1944-
46, 1948; see also Atik, supra note 19, at 236-37 (discussing democracy objections). In
Trimble's memorable phrase, "[t]o reach David Ricardo's Promised Land, we apparently
must do more than restrain misguided diplomacy; we must curtail representative government
as well." Trimble, supra note 8, at 1018.
127. The countermajoritarian aspects of American judicial review have drawn a great
deal of attention. I leave the details of those "bone numbingly familiar debates" for others.
Victoria F. Nourse, Making Constitutional Doctrine in a Realist Age, 145 U. PA. L. REV.
1401, 1447 (1997). For the classic discussion, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DAN-
GEROUS BRANCH (1962). For an interesting recent treatment, see Friedman, supra note 22.
128. See Trimble, supra note 8, at 1027; see also Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judi-
cial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 612-14 (1993) (discussing appointment process).
129. Bello, supra note 87, at 416.
130. See Trimble, supra note 8, at 1027.
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raise legitimacy concerns more serious than those that surround domes-
tic judicial review. 3'
Opponents also point to the secretive nature of WTO proceedings.'32
Under the DSU, panel and appellate-body deliberations remain confi-
dential; their reports, anonymous.' 3  Disclosure requirements seek to
ensure the independence of panelists, but information about the back-
ground of potential panelists is limited, even for members.'
34
Restrictions like these, holdovers from the days of trade pragmatism,
3
only serve to increase opponents' suspicions about the democratic le-
gitimacy of the new regime.'36 And there is little sign of change. While
both the United States and the European Union have suggested reforms
to make the panel process more transparent, the WTO has yet to act on
them. 1
37
The DSU's supporters dismiss these concerns. All treaties diminish
sovereignty to some extent, they observe; for a country to accept some
international-law restraint in pursuit of important national interests is
neither new nor objectionable.'38 In any event, they argue, opponents
greatly exaggerate the threats to sovereignty and democratic govern-
ment. 139 As we have seen, WTO rulings lack effect in national courts.
131. See, e.g., Ways and Means Hearing, supra note 116, at 106-08 (statement of
Bruce Fein).
132. See, e.g., Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 1, at 241, 247-48, 249 (statement
of Ralph Nader); Charnovitz, supra note 20, at 333-34; Housman, supra note 20, at 713-14,
722; Patti Goldman, The Democratization of the Development of United States Trade Policy,
27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 631, 646-47 (1994).
133. DSU art. 14, 33 I.L.M. 1235, art. 17(10), (11), 33 I.L.M. 1236. Parties can disclose
their own positions to the public, but must treat as confidential information that opposing
parties submit to panels. DSU art. 18(2), 33 I.L.M. 1237. In addition, "[a] party to a dispute
shall ... upon request of a Member, provide a non-confidential summary of the information
contained in its written submissions that could be disclosed to the public." Id.
134. See Debevoise, supra note 100, at 821.
135. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 396 & n.99 (discussing secrecy of process under
GATT 1947); Rubenstein & Schultz, supra note 11, at 271 (same).
136. In Senator Moynihan's words, "if you want to lose an argument in this country say
we have turned over our rights to a secret tribunal in a place where they eat frogs and speak
languages we do not understand." Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 1, at 129 (remarks of
the chairman). The secrecy of the dispute-settlement process was a major issue in the United
States debate on accession to the WTO. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 87, at 177 (describing
opposition to WTO).
137. Cf Frances Williams, WTO: Call For Dispute Reform, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1998
(describing the European Union's suggested reforms).
138. See Regional Trade Organizations: Strengthening Or Weakening Global Trade?,
88 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 309, 322 (1994) (remarks of Frederick M. Abbott); Jackson,
supra note 87, at 159; Sprance, supra note 16, at 1231. Some have accused the WTO's crit-
ics of deploying sovereignty arguments in an attempt to disguise their real motivation: self-
interested protectionism. See Bello, supra note 87, at 418.
139. See, e.g., Bello, supra note 87, at 417-18; Gresham & Bloomfield, supra note 108,
at 1163-64; Jackson, supra note 87, at 179-80.
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Members that fail to comply with rulings may face retaliation from ag-
grieved parties, but their courts can continue to apply domestic law,
whatever the WTO decides. 40 And the WTO Agreement allows mem-
bers to withdraw from the organization, for any reason, on six-months
notice.' 4' While members would likely exercise this option only in the
most drastic circumstances, supporters contend that their capacity to do
so provides a check against panel overreaching.
12
II. THE CONFLICT OVER SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The debate on the WTO is not the first Americans have had on the
merits of centralized adjudication. In the first half of the nineteenth
century, the Supreme Court's assertion of authority to review the judg-
ments of state courts on questions of federal law sparked a controversy
remarkably similar to today's. Like today's proponents of the WTO, the
Court's supporters emphasized the need for uniformity, predictability,
and compliance with legal requirements. Like today's critics of the
WTO, the Court's opponents argued that its exercise of jurisdiction over
state courts threatened to undermine local sovereignty and democratic
self-government. The controversy continued for four decades, ending
only with the outbreak of civil war.
This part explores the nineteenth-century conflict over Supreme
Court review. There were several episodes, 43 but this part focuses on
three of the more important: the conflict with Virginia in connection
with the cases of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee'44 and Cohens v.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
141. WTO Agreement art. 15; see also Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 1, at 118-
19 (testimony of John H. Jackson).
142. See Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 1, at 118-19; see also id. at 197
(prepared statement of John H. Jackson); Sprance, supra note 16, at 1233, 1246, 1264. But
cf. Antonio Perez, WTO and U.N. Law: Institutional Comity in National Security, 23 YALE J.
INT'L L. 302, 326 (1998) (noting "practical impossibility of withdrawal from the WTO,
given the importance of the expectations of trade benefits it confers on each member").
143. Warren writes that
[b]etween 1789 and 1860 the courts of seven States denied the constitutional right
of the United States Supreme Court to decide cases on writs of error to State
courts-Virginia, Ohio, Georgia, Kentucky, South Carolina, California, and Wis-
consin. The Legislatures of all these States (except California), and also of
Pennsylvania and Maryland, formally adopted resolutions or statutes against this
power of the Supreme Court.
Warren (pt.l), supra note 22, at 3-4. In addition, at least five bills eliminating the Court's
jurisdiction over states were introduced in Congress during this period, one of which re-
ceived the support of the House Judiciary Committee. See id. at 4; see infra text
accompanying notes 239-242.
144. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816). See infra text accompanying notes 153-178.
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Virginia,4 1 the conflict with Georgia in connection with the Cherokee
cases, 4 6 and the conflict with Wisconsin in connection with the case of
Abelman v. Booth.'4 7 Taken together, these episodes serve to highlight
the main arguments on either side of the debate. In addition, they serve to
demonstrate the Court's continuing failure to prevent state courts from
going their own way in cases that affected important local interests.
4 8
A. The Conflict With Virginia, 1814-22
Congress authorized Supreme Court review of state court judgments
in one of its first pieces of legislation, section twenty-five of the Judici-
ary Act of 1789. 41 Section twenty-five provided for Supreme Court
review in cases where state courts had rejected claims under federal
law: where state courts had denied the validity of a federal statute, for
example, or had upheld the validity of a state statute against a federal
constitutional challenge.'5° In light of the controversy that developed, it
is interesting to note that Congress enacted section twenty-five with
145. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). See infra text accompanying notes 179-208.
146. E.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 557 (1832). See infra text accompa-
nying notes 210-225, 244-245.
147. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). See infra text accompanying notes 262-291.
148. See Warren (pt. 1), supra note 22, at 4
149. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87 (1789); see HAINES, supra
note 22, at 120.
150. In full, section 25 provided:
[A] final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law or equity of a
State in which a decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn in question the
validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States,
and a decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity
of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their
being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or the laws of the United States, and
the decision is in favor of their validity; or where is drawn in question the con-
struction of any clause of the Constitution, of a treaty, or a statute of, or
commission held under the United States, and the decision is against the title,
privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed by either party, under such
clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute or commission, may be reexamined
and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of
error.
I Stat. at 85-87; see Wallace Mendelson, The Judiciary Act of 1789: The Formal Origin of
Federal Judicial Review, 76 JUDICATURE 133, 134-35 (1992) (discussing section 25). "The
basic pattern of review established in 1789 has been altered only by expanding it to include
all federal questions properly presented to state courts, and by gradually shifting all pro-
ceedings to discretionary review by certiorari rather than the formally obligatory appeal
jurisdiction." 16B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 4006, at 121. The present statutory
authorization is at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1994).
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relatively little discussion,'5 ' and that the Court applied it without appar-
ent incident for roughly a quarter-century.'5 2
The calm ended with Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.' Martin involved
a complicated land dispute with important implications for the Virginia
gentry. 4 Denny Martin, a British subject, claimed land in northern Vir-
ginia by virtue of inheritance from his uncle, Lord Fairfax. Virginia law
prohibited aliens from inheriting land, however, and the state had con-
fiscated the Fairfax estate and sold it in parcels to various persons,
including David Hunter. When Hunter brought an ejectment action
against Martin in the Virginia courts, Martin argued that treaties be-
tween the United States and Britain confirmed his title to the land. After
a protracted litigation, the state's highest court, the Virginia Court of
Appeals, decided for Hunter, holding that his claim to the land prevailed
under Virginia law.
5
Martin appealed to the United States Supreme Court. As the case
involved the construction of federal treaties, the Court issued a writ of
error under section twenty-five requiring the Virginia Court of Appeals
to certify the record for examination.16 The court of appeals complied,
and the Supreme Court proceeded to reverse the judgment and remand
the case with instructions that the Virginia court enter a new judgment for
Martin.'57 At this point, the court of appeals took notice. It determined that
151. See HAINES, supra note 22, at 22, 120, 500; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-
Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1557 (1990).
152. See HAINES, supra note 22, at 344 & n.41; Warren (pt.1), supra note 22, at 6.
Between 1790 and 1815, the Supreme Court heard 17 appeals from state courts, John P.
Franck, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 16
(1948), but these episodes passed by "apparently ... without incident." 16B WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 21, § 4006, at 125.
153. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). The following account of the Martin litigation de-
rives from I BOUDIN, supra note 22, at 281-82; G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT
AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35, at 165-66 (abr. ed. 1991); JESSUP, supra note 22, at
161-62; and Warren (pt. 1), supra note 22, at 6-8.
154. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall recused himself in Martin "because of his financial
interests in the land in dispute." WHITE, supra note 153, at 167; see also JESSUP, supra note
22, at 170 n.54 (discussing Marshall's interest in the case). Marshall may have participated
secretly in the case. See infra note 167.
155. Hunter v. Fairfax's Devisee, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 218 (1810), rev'd 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 603 (1813).
156. See Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 603-04 (1813);
Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1, 5 (1814) (opinion of Cabell, J.), rev'd 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304 (1816); see also WHITE, supra note 153, at 166; Warren (pt. 1), supra note 22,
at 8.
157. See Fairfax's Devisee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 628. The Court's mandate is set forth
in the Virginia court's opinion on remand. See Hunter, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) at 1-3; see also id.
at 7 (opinion of Cabell, J.) (discussing mandate). Historians dispute whether a majority of
the Court's members actually joined the Court's opinion. Compare I WARREN, supra note
22, at 446 with WHITE, supra note 153, at 166 n.45.
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it had "improvidently" complied with the writ of error and requested
counsel's views on the question whether it should comply with the
Court's mandate reversing its judgment. 158
After an unusually long argument,'59 the court decided not to com-
ply.'" The judges did not object to judicial review itself, 6' nor to the
idea that federal law preempted inconsistent state law. They objected to
the claim of federal judicial supremacy: in their view, the United States
Supreme Court lacked authority to make its judgments binding on state
courts. 62 "What [the federal] constitution is," Judge Cabell wrote in the
lead opinion, "what [federal] laws and treaties are, must, in cases com-
ing before the State Courts, be decided by the State Judges, according to
their own judgments, and upon their own responsibility."'63 Any other
view "would, sooner or later, terminate in an entire consolidation of the
states into one complete national sovereignty. '64 Judge Cabell also re-
jected the argument that Supreme Court review was necessary to
promote "uniformity of decision.' 16' By encouraging consolidation in
the federal government, he wrote, Supreme Court review "would pro-
duce evils greater than those of the occasional collisions which it would
be designed to remedy."
66
Martin appealed once more to the United States Supreme Court.
This time, the court of appeals refused to respond to the Court's writ of
error, and the Court considered the case on a "makeshift record" pro-
vided by the attorneys.' 67 Once again, it reversed the court of appeals'
judgment. 68 Writing for the Court, Justice Joseph Story maintained that
review of state judgments did not impermissibly diminish state sover-
158. Hunter, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) at 1, 3.
159. Id. at 3.
160. Id. at58.
161. For an interesting analysis of antebellum Americans' failure to focus on the anti-
democratic aspects of judicial review, see Friedman, supra note 22, at 343, 382, 409-10.
162. For discussions of this aspect of the Virginia court's opinion, see 1 BOUDIN, supra
note 22, at 284-85, 286; HAINES, supra note 22, at 342-43, 345-46.
163. Hunter, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) at 11 (opinion of Cabell, J.); see also id. at 24 (opinion
of Brooke, J.).
164. Id. at 9 (opinion of Cabell, J.); see also id. at 45 (opinion of Roane, J.).
165. Id. at 15 (opinion of Cabell, J.); see also id. at 45 (opinion of Roane, J.).
166. Id. at 9 (opinion of Cabell, J.); see also HAINES, supra note 22, at 345. Judge
Spencer Roane argued that section 25 failed to promote uniformity. He noted that section 25
authorized Supreme Court review only where state courts had decided against federal
claims. As a result, he observed, section 25 created the "novel spectacle ... of a court being
of the last resort or otherwise, as its decision may happen to have been for one or other of the
parties." Hunter, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) at 45 (opinion of Roane, J.).
167. WHITE, supra note 153, at 169. For an interesting discussion of the procedural ir-
regularities in Martin, including a claim that Chief Justice Marshall secretly participated in
the case, see id. at 167-73.
168. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 362 (1816).
[Vol. 20:775
Sovereignty, Compliance, and the WTOSummer 1999]
eignty. 69 The Constitution had created a new government, he observed,
"in many respects, national, and in all, supreme."'7 As a component of
that government, Article III had established a Supreme Court with ap-
pellate jurisdiction of cases arising under federal law. 7' "From the very
nature of things," Story reasoned, that jurisdiction must extend to cases
in state as well as federal courts. 7 2 To hold otherwise would be to
"interpose a limitation" on federal power "where the people [had] not
been disposed to create one."'1
73
In addition, Story argued, Supreme Court review promoted uni-
formity, rationality, and compliance with federal norms.7 4 Without
Supreme Court review, different states might reach different conclu-
sions on questions of federal law. "If there were no revising authority to
control these jarring and discordant judgments," he wrote, "the laws, the
treaties, and the constitution of the United States would be different in
different states, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the same con-
struction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two.' ' 75 The "public mischiefs
that would attend such a state of things would be truly deplorable.' 76
The Framers had understood, moreover, that "state attachments, state
prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests, might sometimes ob-
struct... the regular administration of justice."'' 7  Supreme Court review
could serve to neutralize any anti-federal bias.
The Martin Court avoided a second confrontation with the court of
appeals, issuing its mandate directly to the Virginia district court, and
for a while the controversy seemed to abate.7 7 But the matter was far
from settled. Five years later, the issue rose again in another case from
the Virginia courts, Cohens v. Virginia.7 9 Philip and Mendes Cohen had
169. Id. at 342-43. Story later repeated his arguments in his treatise on the Constitu-
tion. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
819, at 582-83, §§ 907-911, at 646-49 (photo. reprint 1987) (1833).
170. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 328.
171. Id. (discussing U.S. CONST. art. III); id. at 337-39.
172. Id. at 345.
173. Id. at 351. Story noted that the Court's appellate jurisdiction over state courts
"was, previous to [the Constitution's] adoption, uniformly and publicly avowed by its
friends, and admitted by its enemies, as the basis of their respective reasonings, both in and
out of the state conventions," and that state courts had complied with the Court's mandates
"in a great variety of cases." Id.; see also supra note 152 (discussing early history of Su-
preme Court review).
174. See Martin, 14 U.S. at 347-48.
175. Id. at 348.
176. Id.
177. Id. at347.
178. See JESSUP, supra note 22, at 163; Warren (pt. 1), supra note 22, at 12.
179. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). For good descriptions of the Cohens litigation, see
HAINES, supra note 22, at 427-28; JESSUP, supra note 22, at 204; WHITE, supra note 153, at
504-05.
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sold lottery tickets in Virginia as part of an effort to raise funds for the
District of Columbia. Although federal law authorized their actions,
Virginia law made it a crime to sell lottery tickets within the state, and
the Cohens were convicted in a state prosecution.80 The Cohens ap-
pealed their convictions to the United States Supreme Court,"' arguing
that jurisdiction existed under section twenty-five of the Judiciary Act,
as the Virginia court had decided in favor of the constitutionality of the
state anti-lottery statute. 182
The Court agreed to hear the case, and Virginia erupted. A
"barrage" of articles condemning the Court appeared in the Richmond
press, some suggesting that the Court's decision to take Cohens was part
of a "consolidationist campaign" to eliminate state sovereignty. 83 The
legislature passed resolutions declaring that the Court had no right to
examine the judgments of state courts and instructing state's counsel to
limit their argument before the Court to the question of jurisdiction. 84
Counsel followed instructions, arguing Cohens almost as though Martin
did not exist.' "If it shall be established," Alexander Smythe told the
Justices, "that this Court has appellate jurisdiction over the State Courts
S. . a complete consolidation of the States ... is produced.' 86 For his
part, Philip Barbour informed the Court "that he wished to be distinctly
understood, as not yielding his assent to the doctrine of Hunter v. Mar-
tin."'87 On that matter, he advised the Justices, he "decidedly concurred
with the Court of Appeals of Virginia."' 88
In a unanimous opinion, the Court rejected this second challenge to
its appellate jurisdiction.'89 Opposition to Supreme Court review, Chief
Justice Marshall explained, derived from the assumption that the states
were independent sovereigns.'90 But they were not: the Constitution had
established a regime in which the states were, for some purposes, sub-
180. See HAINES, supra note 22, at 428; JESSUP, supra note 22, at 204.
181. The Cohens appealed from a decision of an inferior state court, there being "no
higher State tribunal which could take cognizance of the case." Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
at 376 n.31; see also WHITE, supra note 153, at 506.
182. See WHITE, supra note 153, at 505.
183. Id. at 506, 510.
184. Id. at 505; 1 WARREN, supra note 22, at 547-48. For the text of these resolutions,
see Journal of the Virginia House of Delegates 46 (1820); STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL
RELATIONS 103 (Herman V. Ames ed.) (photo. reprint 1970) (1900) [hereinafter STATE
DOCUMENTS].
185. See WHITE, supra note 153, at 504; see also 1 BOUDIN, supra note 22, at 303.
186. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 320 (emphasis added).
187. Id. at 310 n.4.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 430. The Court also rejected the claim that it had no jurisdiction in the case
because a state was a defendant. See id. at 378, 412.
190. See id. at 413.
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ordinate to the federal government.' 9' As a result, there was nothing
"unreasonable" in giving the Court "a supervising power" over state
court judgments on questions of federal law.'92 Indeed, Marshall wrote,
"the necessity of uniformity, as well as correctness in expounding the
constitution and laws of the United States," suggested the need for a
"single tribunal [with] the power of deciding, in the last resort, all cases
in which they are involved."' 93
On the merits, the Court affirmed the Cohens' convictions, thereby
precluding further action in the Virginia courts.' 94 But reaction in the
state was swift and hostile. In his message to the opening session of the
legislature, Governor Randolph dwelled on Virginia's "'humiliation and
mortification'" at the hands of the court. 95 Judge Spencer Roane of the
court of appeals, meanwhile, wrote a series of newspaper articles at-
tacking the decision under the name "Algernon Sidney."'96 Roane
repeated many of the arguments he and his colleagues had made five
years earlier in Hunter.97 State courts had an obligation to apply federal
law, he conceded, but they had no obligation to comply with the rulings
of federal courts.' 98 By claiming a right to reverse the judgments of state
courts, the Court threatened to upset the constitutional balance and es-
tablish a consolidated government in which states would cease to
exist.199
Roane scoffed at the idea that Supreme Court review was necessary
to promote uniformity. State courts had an interest in preserving the
Constitution, he contended; they would not casually force "collisions"
191. See id. at 414
192. Seeid. at421.
193. Id. at 416. Like Story, Marshall noted that advocates had described the Court's
appellate jurisdiction at the time of the Constitution's adoption, see id. at 418-20, and that
the Court's jurisdiction had been "assented to, with a single exception, by the Courts of
every State... whose judgments have been revised." Id. at 420.
194. See id. at 447-48. On Marshall's possible strategy in affirming on the merits in
Cohens, see 1 BoUDIN, supra note 22, at 306; JEssuP, supra note 22, at 205.
195. JESSUP, supra note 22, at 209.
196. Id. at 205. This was not the first time Roane had attacked Chief Justice Marshall in
print. Two years earlier, Roane had written a series of articles attacking Marshall's opinion
in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), under the name "Hampden." For
those articles, and Marshall's pseudonymous replies, see JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF
McCulloch v. Maryland (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 159-166.
198. See Letter from Algernon Sidney to the Richmond Enquirer (June 1, 1821), re-
printed in 2 BRANCH HISTORICAL PAPERS OF RANDOLPH-MACON COLLEGE 109, 115
(William E. Dodd ed., 1905) [hereinafter BRANCH HISTORICAL PAPERS].
199. See Letter from Algernon Sidney to the Richmond Enquirer (June 8, 1821), re-
printed in 2 BRANCH HISTORICAL PAPERS, supra note 198, at 153, 174; see also Letter from
Algernon Sidney to the Richmond Enquirer (May 25, 1821), reprinted in 2 BRANCH His-
TORICAL PAPERS, supra note 198, at 78, 80.
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with the federal courts. 200 To be sure, occasional clashes might create
inconvenience for the national government.20 ' But occasional inconven-
ience was hardly a reason to sacrifice the independence of state courts.
"It is as well," Roane argued, "that the course of the general government
should be arrested for a season, as that the rights of the states should be
forever swept away. 202
Roane attempted to organize opposition to the Court, and for a
while vigorous debate on Cohens appeared in newspapers around the
country. °3 Alarmed, Marshall thought he detected a conspiracy to over-
throw the Constitution.'04 "'The attack upon the Judiciary is in fact an
attack upon the Union,"' he wrote Story; he warned supporters to be
"'on the alert'" for an attempt to repeal the Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion.05 But the controversy fizzled out. The Court's disposition of
Cohens made further resistance within Virginia superfluous, and outsid-
ers quickly lost interest in the state's "humiliation" at the hands of the
Justices.2 O Roane died soon thereafter, disappointed at the failure of his
200. See Letter from Algernon Sidney to the Richmond Enquirer (June 5, 1821), re-
printed in 2 BRANCH HISTORICAL PAPERS, supra note 198, at 132, 137.
201. See Letter from Algernon Sidney to the Richmond Enquirer (June 5, 1821), re-
printed in 2 BRANCH HISTORICAL PAPERS, supra note 198, at 132, 133; Letter from Algernon
Sidney to the Richmond Enquirer (June 1, 1821), reprinted in 2 BRANCH HISTORICAL PA-
PERS, supra note 198, at 109, 119.
202. Letter from Algernon Sidney to the Richmond Enquirer (June 1, 1821), reprinted
in 2 BRANCH HISTORICAL PAPERS, supra note 198, at 109, 119; see also Letter from Alger-
non Sidney to the Richmond Enquirer (May 29, 1821), reprinted in 2 BRANCH HISTORICAL
PAPERS, supra note 198, at 91, 105.
203. See JESSUP, supra note 22, at 206-11; 1 WARREN, supra note 22, at 554-60;
WHITE, supra note 153, at 521-23. Roane's arguments were echoed by his fellow Virginia
Republican, the prolix John Taylor, who in the early 1820s wrote a series of prominent
books criticizing federal consolidation in general and Supreme Court review in particular.
See JOHN TAYLOR, NEW VIEWS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 22-24, 127-
69 (photo. reprint ed. 1971) (1823); see also JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED AND
CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED 129-46 (photo. reprint 1970) (1820). On Taylor's place in
American politics, see Loren Baritz, Introduction to JOHN TAYLOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES iX, x-xi (Loren Baritz
ed., 1969); F. Thornton Miller, Foreword to JOHN TAYLOR, TYRANNY UNMASKED iX, xxi (F.
Thornton Miller ed., 1992).
204. See JESSUP, supra note 22, at 208-09; 1 WARREN, supra note 22, at 560-63. Mar-
shall particularly resented Roane's criticism, which was at times personally insulting. See,
e.g., Letter from Algernon Sidney to the Richmond Enquirer (May 25, 1821), reprinted in 2
BRANCH HISTORICAL PAPERS, supra note 198, at 78, 82-83 (characterizing Marshall's opin-
ion in Cohens as "monstrous" and reflective of "that love of power ... which infects and
corrupts ... even the high and ermined judges"). Roane and Marshall had clashed in the
press before. See supra note 196.
205. See I WARREN, supra note 22, at 562-63 (quoting Marshall-Story correspon-
dence).
206. When a member of Virginia's congressional delegation introduced a bill to repeal
section twenty-five, it received no support. JESSUP, supra note 22, at 210. The bill was tabled
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campaign against the Court."7 The conflict over Supreme Court review
had ended-temporarily.
20 8
B. Georgia and the Crisis of 1830-32
One can readily see how the arguments made in connection with
Martin and Cohens-Story and Marshall's claims about uniformity and
compliance with federal norms, Roane's objections about sovereignty
and local control-anticipate today's controversy with regard to the
WTO.2 9 They also set the stage for further debate on Supreme Court
review. For if the Court's supporters believed that the conflict with Vir-
ginia had secured their position, they were soon disappointed. The
Court's next crisis occurred at the start of the following decade, when
the idea of Supreme Court review came under serious attack in the state
of Georgia and in Congress as well." °
The conflict with Georgia stemmed from the state's attempt to exer-
cise authority over the Cherokee Nation, an Indian tribe located on lands
within Georgia's borders. Federal treaties guaranteed the Cherokees'
sovereignty over these lands, and the Cherokees had proclaimed them-
selves an independent state.2' Nonetheless, in 1828, Georgia adopted a
number of measures to establish its jurisdiction over tribal lands.2 ' 2 It
officially annexed the Cherokee territory and nullified all Cherokee
laws; it also enacted a statute requiring white people living in Cherokee
territory to obtain residency licenses and swear allegiance to Georgia
law.2 3 Georgia's actions received the support of the newly-elected
at the request of its sponsor. See CONG. DEB. 1681-82 (April 1822) (remarks of Rep. Steven-
son).
207. See JESSUP, supra note 22, at 206, 211, 237. Roane was particularly disappointed
in Thomas Jefferson, who, having encouraged Roane to "broaden the geographical base of
the attack on the Court," avoided public involvement in the controversy. Id. at 207.
208. See WHITE, supra note 153, at 523-24.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 108-142 (discussing debate on dispute settle-
ment by the WTO).
210. See JESSUP, supra note 22, at 355 (conflict with Georgia "brought the Court to a
low point in judicial efficacy on constitutional questions"); Warren (pt.2), supra note 22, at
161 ("In 1831 there occurred the most determined and the most dangerous attack on the
Supreme Court and its jurisdiction under the 25th Section.").
Opposition to Supreme Court review also emerged periodically during the 1820s. Ken-
tucky, for example, refused to comply for eight years with a Court decision invalidating
certain real property laws, and the Ohio legislature overwhelmingly passed a resolution
against Supreme Court review in response to a ruling that struck down state tax legislation.
See HAINES, supra note 22, at 463-80; JESSUP, supra note 22, at 213-44. There were also
occasional calls in Congress to eliminate the Court's appellate jurisdiction over state courts.
See id. at 427 (listing efforts).
211. See HAINES, supra note 22, at 596-97; JESSUP, supra note 22, at 359-60.
212. See JESSUP, supra note 22, at 360-61.
213. See id.
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President Andrew Jackson, who, despite treaty obligations, recom-
mended removal of the Indians to a region west of the Mississippi
River
2 4
Georgia's policy toward the Cherokees first came before the Court
in 1830 in the case of Corn Tassel, a Cherokee who had been convicted
of murder and sentenced to death under Georgia law.25 The murder had
occurred on tribal territory, and Tassel appealed his conviction to the
Supreme Court, arguing that prosecution under Georgia law violated
federal treaty obligations.26 The Court scheduled the case for argument
in January 1831 and, in December 1830, served an order on Governor
George Gilmer requiring Georgia's appearance to defend the convic-
tion."7 Gilmer informed the Georgia legislature that he would disregard
the order, and the legislature responded by passing resolutions con-
demning the Court's "interference" and forbidding state officers from
complying with any "mandate ... purporting to proceed from ... the
Supreme Court of the United States, for the purpose of arresting the
execution of any of the criminal laws of this State."2 8 Georgia executed
Tassel two days later, on December 24, 1830.219
The following year, the Court faced a challenge to the Georgia stat-
ute requiring white people to obtain licenses to live in Cherokee
territory. Georgia prosecuted two missionaries who had defied the law
and sentenced them to four years at hard labor. 220 The missionaries ap-
pealed their convictions to the Supreme Court, arguing that the license
221
requirement violated the federal constitution . Once more, the Court
issued an order requiring Georgia to appear before it; once more, the
governor, with the approval of the Georgia legislature, refused to com-
ply.122 In Worcester v. Georgia, decided early in 1832, the Court held the
licensing statute unconstitutional, reversed the missionaries' convic-
214. Id.
215. See I WARREN, supra note 22, at 733; see also JESSUP, supra note 22, at 363-64.
Tassel's name sometimes appears as "George Tassels." See I WARREN, supra note 22, at 733
n. 1.
216. See HAINES, supra note 22, at 598; Warren (pt. 2), supra note 22, at 167.
217. JESSUP, supra note 22, at 363; Warren (pt.2), supra note 22, at 167.
218. Resolutions of the Legislature Relative to the Case of George Tassels, December
22, 1830, reprinted in STATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 184, at 127; see also Friedman, supra
note 22, at 396; Warren (pt. 2), supra note 22, at 167-68.
219. Warren (pt.2), supra note 22, at 168; see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
(5 Pet.) 1, 12-13 (1831) (describing Tassel case). The Georgia legislature had directed that
Tassel's execution be expedited. THURMAN WILKINS, CHEROKEE TRAGEDY 216 (2d ed.
1986). Four years later, Georgia executed another prisoner notwithstanding a writ of error
from the Court. Warren (pt. 2), supra note 22, at 174; see also HAINES, supra note 22, at 603.
220. JESSUP, supra note 22, at 367.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 367-68; Warren (pt. 2), supra note 22, at 169.
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tions, and ordered their release.223 The Georgia courts simply ignored the
mandate.24 As Charles Warren describes it, "[t]he two prisoners re-
mained in prison; and everything went on exactly as if the Supreme
Court had rendered no decision. '25
Supreme Court review had been coming under serious attack in
Congress as well. In the Senate, the Court's jurisdiction over state
courts was a central question in a famous debate between Daniel
Webster of Massachusetts and Robert Hayne of South Carolina. 26 The
Webster-Hayne debate, largely forgotten today, transfixed the nation in
1830; visitors packed the Senate gallery to hear the two men, and sup-
porters distributed more than 100,000 copies of Webster's speech
throughout the country.2 7 The debate began when, in comments on fed-
eral land policy, Hayne warned of the dangers of consolidating too
much power in the national government.228 In a two-part reply, Webster
moved beyond land policy to defend the need for federal supremacy
generally.229
223. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 562-63 (1832); see also Warren (pt.
2), supra note 22, at 169.
224. See Friedman, supra note 22, at 395.
225. Warren (pt.2), supra note 22, at 171. It is in connection with Worcester v. Georgia
that Andrew Jackson allegedly made the famous remark, "Well, John Marshall has made his
decision, now let him enforce it." See I WARREN, supra note 22, at 759 & n.I. Jackson may
not have said that, specifically, see id., but he had little sympathy either with the Chief Jus-
tice or the Cherokees, and he certainly did say "other things in the same spirit." PETERSON,
supra note 226, at 214; see also JESSUP, supra note 22, at 370-71.
226. See 1 WARREN, supra note 22, at 721. For good descriptions of the debate, a major
event in antebellum history, see DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LIBERTY AND UNION 31-33
(1978); MERRILL D. PETERSON, THE GREAT TRIUMVERATE 170-83 (1987).
227. See PETERSON, supra note 226, at 175, 179; see also 1 THOMAS A. BAILEY, THE
AMERICAN PAGEANT 259-60 (3d ed. 1966). "No speech in the English language, perhaps no
speech in modem times, had ever been as widely diffused and widely read" as Webster's
Second Reply to Hayne. PETERSON, supra note 226, at 179-80. Its famous conclusion, an
emotional tribute to "Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable," became a
standard part of the school curriculum, memorized by "tens of thousands of impressionable
schoolboys," BAILEY, supra, at 260, and "declaimed from a thousand platforms over the next
three decades." DONALD, supra note 226, at 32. Lincoln referred to the speech while writing
his First Inaugural Address, and it was said that "[e]very Union cannon was shotted with the
Reply to Hayne." PETERSON, supra note 226, at 496.
228. DONALD, supra note 226, at 32. Hayne also annoyed Webster by making some
disparaging comments about New England's behavior during the War of 1812. Id.
229. Id. Webster claimed to have been drawn unprepared into the "discussion of so
grave and important a subject," CONG. DEB. 79 (Jan. 27, 1830), but there is some indication
that he had been waiting for an opportunity to join the issue. HAINES, supra note 22, at
557-58.
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For Webster, Supreme Court review played an essential role in se-
curing federal supremacy. 3 The Constitution made clear that federal
law took precedence over state law. But questions of interpretation were
sure to arise-indeed, they had arisen already-and if states could de-
cide for themselves what federal law required, "the General
Government would be good for nothing."23' Like Story and Marshall,
Webster stressed the need for uniformity in American law. Could any-
thing be "more preposterous," he asked, "than to make a government for
the whole Union, and yet leave its powers subject, not to one interpreta-
tion, but to thirteen, or twenty-four? '23 2 Such a regime would not be a
government at all, Webster proclaimed, but "a collection of topics, for
everlasting controversy; heads of debate for a disputatious people.2 33
In response, Hayne drew the same distinction between legal and ju-
dicial supremacy that the Virginia court had drawn in the Martin
litigation.34 The Constitution made federal law supreme, Hayne con-
ceded, but it did not give the Court power "to bind the States by its
decisions. 235 If the Constitution had done so, the states would never
have ratified it: it was unthinkable that the states would "under any cir-
cumstances, have consented to leave to a court to be created by the
Federal Government, the power to decide ... on the extent" of federal
authority.236 Nor did Hayne agree that Supreme Court review was neces-
sary in the interests of uniformity. In the event of a serious conflict
between a state and the Court on a question of federal power, the matter
could be referred to the states as a body, who could settle the matter by
amending the Constitution on a three-fourths vote.237
The Senate debate on Supreme Court review ended inconclusively a
few months later, after several senators had joined in on either side.238
The topic came up again the following year, this time in the House of
Representatives. Over a vigorous dissent, and instigated by what it
230. See CONG DEB. 78 (Jan. 27, 1830). Without Supreme Court review, Webster be-
lieved, the United States Government "would, in all probability, have been now among




234. See supra text accompanying notes 159-166.
235. CONG. DEB. 87 (Jan. 27, 1830).
236. Id. at 88.
237. Id. at 89.
238. See PETERSON, supra note 226, at 179; see also BAILEY, supra note 227, at 260; 1
WARREN, supra note 22, at 721-24. For speeches supporting Supreme Court review, see, for
example, CONG DEB. 149, 152-53 (Feb. 9, 1830) (Barton); id. at 161 (Feb. 19, 1830)
(Holmes); id. at 229 (March 4, 1830) (Clayton); id. at 266-67 (March 15, 1830)
(Livingston). For speeches opposing Supreme Court review, see id. at 112 (Feb. 2, 1830)
(Benton); id. at 137-44 (Feb. 8, 1830) (Rowan).
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called "an accumulation of grievances" against the Court, the House
Judiciary Committee issued a report in January 1831 recommending
repeal of section twenty-five of the Judiciary Act. 23 9 Fifteen years after
the Court had attempted to resolve the matter in Martin, the House
committee took the position that Supreme Court review was unconstitu-
tional. Section twenty-five, its report stated, had improperly conferred
on the Court "a supervisory and controlling power over ... sovereign
states. ' 24' Moreover, and despite the claims of its supporters, Supreme
Court review had done little to promote uniformity and cohesion in
American law. Indeed, the committee alleged, the Court's assertion of
authority over state courts "had given rise to painful collisions in the
State and Federal authorities, calculated to disturb the harmony of our
system.
' 2A2
Just as it had during the conflict with Virginia a decade earlier, the
Court's outlook seemed bleak. "'You may depend,"' Story wrote a cor-
respondent in January 1831, "'that our wisest friends look with great
gloom to the future.' ,,243 Once more, though, the controversy subsided.
Like Virginia, Georgia discovered that its troubles with the Court failed
to arouse much sympathy outside the state. 2" Georgia's imprisonment of
the missionaries eventually became a political embarrassment for the
Jackson Administration in Washington, and Administration allies per-
suaded Georgia's governor to pardon the two in 1832.24' In the House,
239. JESSUP, supra note 22, at 346; HAINES, supra note 22, at 593; Friedman, supra
note 22, at 392. The dissenting members issued a counter-report arguing that Supreme Court
review was "essential to the preservation of the General Government." Counter Report on
the Judiciary, CONG. DEB. app. at lxxxi, lxxxii (1831). Charles Warren believed that the
counter-report, drafted by future President James Buchanan, "must be regarded as one of the
great and signal documents in the history of American constitutional law." 1 WARREN, supra
note 22, at 739. Readers must judge for themselves.
240. Committee Report upon the Judiciary, CONG. DEB. app. at lxxvii, lxxvii (1831).
241. Id. at lxxviii.
242. Id. at lxxix.
243. Warren (pt.2), supra note 22, at 163 (quoting letter from Story to George Ticknor,
Jan. 22, 1831).
244. In March 1831, at the height of the conflict, the Massachusetts legislature passed a
series of resolutions condemning Georgia's conduct and defending the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. JESSUP, supra note 22, at 366. The legislatures of Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
and Connecticut followed suit, see STATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 184, at 130-31, Con-
necticut's explaining that "[t]he courts of the several states partake too readily of local
jealousies and excitements, to be entrusted with the final determinations of questions in-
volving the validity or construction of the federal laws." Report and Resolutions of
Connecticut, May Session 1831, reprinted in id. at 131-32.
245. JESSUP, supra note 22, at 370; see also 1 WARREN, supra note 22, at 776; Warren
(pt. 2), supra note 22, at 173. The missionaries' imprisonment became a political liability for
the Jackson Administration during the Nullification Crisis of 1832. The crisis began when
South Carolina passed an ordinance declaring certain federal tariff legislation unconstitu-
tional and forbidding its enforcement within the state. Ordinance of Nullification of South
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meanwhile, the bill to repeal section twenty-five lost in a lopsided
vote."6 Its proponents complained that parliamentary maneuvers had
prevented the bill's full consideration, but to no avail.247 The debate on
Supreme Court review had ended-again, temporarily.
C. The Conflict With Wisconsin, 1854-59
For the next twenty years, the Court's jurisdiction over state courts
drew little public attention.2 4 ' The controversy continued to bubble be-
neath the surface, though. In his Discourse on the Constitution and
Government of the United States, written between 1845 and 1849, John
C. Calhoun gave the subject extended treatment.24 9 Like Roane and
Hayne before him-and like today's opponents of the WTO-Calhoun
perceived grave dangers for local autonomy.25 In granting the Court
jurisdiction over state courts, he wrote, Congress had impermissibly
stripped the states of their sovereignty and reduced them to an inferior
Carolina, Nov. 24, 1832, reprinted in STATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 184, at 169. Jackson
threatened to use force to uphold federal law in South Carolina, but the crisis ended when
Congress passed a new compromise tariff in 1833. See DONALD, supra note 226, at 12-14;
PETERSON, supra note 226, at 212-34. Jackson's failure to threaten force to uphold federal
law in Georgia was an embarrassing inconsistency during the Nullification Crisis, and Ad-
ministration allies in Georgia convinced Governor Lumpkin to moot the question by
pardoning the missionaries. JEssuP, supra note 22, at 370.
Interestingly, the South Carolina nullification ordinance expressly prohibited appeals to
the Supreme Court. Ordinance of Nullification of South Carolina, reprinted in STATE DOcu-
MENTS, supra, at 171. For a discussion of the role of Supreme Court review in the
Nullification Crisis, see JESSUP, supra note 22, at 374-87.
246. The vote, on a motion to reject, was 138 to 51. CONG. DEB. 542 (Jan. 29, 1831);
see also JEssuP, supra note 22, at 347. The bill drew strong support from Virginia, Georgia,
South Carolina and Kentucky-states that had challenged the Court's jurisdiction in the
past-but virtually no support from New England and the Middle Atlantic states. JESSUP,
supra note 22, at 347, 397 n. l 11.
247. CONG. DEB. 660 (Feb. 9, 1831) (remarks of Rep. Daniel). Proponents did get a
chance to air their views in a subsequent debate on printing extra copies of the Judiciary
Committee's report. For samples of the debate, which sometimes became quite heated, see
id. at 620-22 (Feb. 7, 1831), 658-70 (Feb. 9, 1831), 730-40 (Feb. 17, 1831), 790 (Feb. 25,
1831).
248. Goldstein argues that the lack of resistance in the 1840s "can be explained by the
fact that, after the mid-I 830s, as a result of electoral politics and judicial appointments, the
Supreme Court was dominated by pro-states-rights [J]ustices." Goldstein, supra note 22, at
159.
249. A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States, in I WORKS
OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 108, 263-65, 317-46, 383-84 (Richard G. Cralle ed., photo. reprint
1968) (1851) [hereinafter Discourse]. On the timing of the work, see PETERSON, supra note
226, at 409; Discourse, supra, at vii.
250. For Roane's views, see supra text accompanying notes 196-202; for Hayne's
views, see supra text accompanying notes 234-237. For the arguments of the WTO's oppo-
nents, see supra text accompanying notes 122-137.
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status.' He dismissed arguments about the need for uniformity.252 The
point of section twenty-five was not uniformity, Calhoun wrote, but the
consolidation of power in the federal government.253 Its repeal would be
"[t]he first and indispensable step" in restoring the states to "their true
position" in the constitutional framework.
254
The Discourse appeared posthumously in 185 1.255 Shortly thereafter,
opposition to Supreme Court review resumed in earnest, this time in the
West and North.256 In 1854, the California Supreme Court ruled that
parties could not appeal its judgments to the United States Supreme
Court.257 It had considered both the Court's opinion in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee258 and Calhoun's argument in the Discourse, the Cali-
fornia court explained, and come to the conclusion that Calhoun was
correct. 9 In Ohio, meanwhile, the state supreme court delayed for three
years, from 1853 to 1856, before entering the Court's mandate in a tax
case.' 6° When it did so, it drew a bitter dissent from the state's chief jus-
tice, who complained that Supreme Court review "wholly prostrates the
... sovereignty of the people within the state.
The most serious conflict, though, occurred with the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court in Abelman v. Booth . The case, which attracted national
attention, began in 1854, when the federal marshal in Wisconsin ar-
rested a local abolitionist, Sherman Booth, on the charge of aiding the
251. See Discourse, supra note 249, at 318-19, 338-39. Calhoun thought it "probable"
that the First Congress had enacted section 25 "without a clear conception of the principle on
which it rested, or the extent to which it might be carried." Id. at 342.
252. Id. at 325-30.
253. See id. at 328-30. Just as Roane had, see supra note 166, Calhoun stressed the fact
that section 25 authorized Supreme Court review only in cases where state courts had ruled
against federal claims. If "uniformity of decision" were one of its "objects," he observed,
section 25 "was very illy calculated to accomplish it." Id. at 326.
254. Id. at 383-84.
255. Id. at viii.
256. See 1 BOUDIN, supra note 22, at 466.
257. Johnson v. Gordon, 4 Cal. 368, 374 (1854).
258. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816).
259. Johnson, 4 Cal. at 369, 370; see also I BOUDIN, supra note 22, at 476-78; Warren
(pt. 2), supra note 22, at 176. Warren believed that California's hostility to Supreme Court
review was "probably due to the peculiar isolated situation of litigation in that State, at that
period, when there was absence of railroad communication, and little contact with the rest of
the Union." 2 WARREN, supra note 22, at 257. The California Supreme Court reversed John-
son four years later, over a vigorous dissent by its chief justice. Ferris v. Coover, 11 Cal. 175
(1858); 2 WARREN, supra note 22, at 257-58 & n.2.
260. See Piqua Bank v. Knoop, 3 Ohio St. 342 (1856); see also 2 WARREN, supra note
22, at 256; Warren (pt. 2), supra note 22, at 178-81. The Supreme Court had issued the
mandate in connection with State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1853).
261. Piqua Branch, 3 Ohio St. at 346 (Bartley, C.J., dissenting); see also 2 WARREN,
supra note 22, at 256.
262. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
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escape of a runaway slave in violation of the federal Fugitive Slave
Law. 26' There were no federal prisons in Wisconsin, so the marshal
placed Booth in a state jail to await trial. 264 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court ordered Booth's release on a writ of habeas corpus, holding that
the Fugitive Slave Law was unconstitutional. 265 The marshal appealed
this ruling to the United States Supreme Court and, in the meanwhile,
arrested Booth a second time.26 After a three-day trial, a federal district
court convicted Booth of violating the Fugitive Slave Law and commit-
261ted him to state prison. Undeterred, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
again ordered his release.268
At this point, the United States Attorney General intervened. The
Attorney General appealed the Wisconsin court's second decision to the
United States Supreme Court, which issued a writ of error requiring the
Wisconsin court to certify the record for examination.2 6 ' Although the
Wisconsin court had complied with the writ of error in the marshal's
appeal, not yet argued,27° it ignored the second writ and instructed its
clerk to make no note of it in the official records.2 ' In Washington, the
Court hesitated, hoping that the Wisconsin court would reconsider.2
The Court ultimately decided to hear the case, together with the mar-
shal's appeal, on the basis of a record that the United States Attorney
had managed to obtain through other means."'
The Court heard argument in January 1859 and issued its decision
two months later.274 More than forty years after Martin v. Hunter's Les-
263. See I BOUDIN, supra note 22, at 479-80, 507. For an excellent account of the
Booth litigation, see CARL B. SWISHER, THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64, at 653-75 (vol. 5 of
The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States (Paul
A. Freund ed.) (1974)).
264. See SWISHER, supra note 263, at 660.
265. See id. at 657.
266. See Abelman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 509 ; see also SWISHER, supra note 263, at
658.
267. See SWISHER, supra note 263, at 658-59.
268. See In re Booth and Rycraft, 3 Wis. 144 (1855); see also Abelman, 62 U.S. (21
How.) at 511; SWISHER, supra note 263, at 660.
269. Abelman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 511-12; see also Warren (pt. 2), supra note 22, at
182.
270. Abelman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 509; see also SWISHER, supra note 263, at 660.
271. See Abelman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 512, 514; see also SWISHER, supra note 263, at
661.
272. Id. at 661.
273. Id. at 660-61. The United States Attorney had secured the record from the Wis-
consin court "without disclosing his purpose." Id.
274. Swisher suggests that the Court delayed so long in hearing the case because of
criticism it had received for its decision two years earlier in the Dred Scott case, Dred Scott
v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See SWISHER, supra note 263, at 662.
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see,"' the Court found it necessary to explain once more that it had
authority to review state court judgments on questions of federal law.276
Chief Justice Roger Taney' s opinion for a unanimous Court stressed the
need for uniformity and compliance with legal requirements-themes
repeated by the WTO's supporters today. 7 Without Supreme Court re-
view, Taney argued, state judges would give federal law a variety of
different interpretations, "and the Government of the United States
would soon become one thing in one State and another thing in an-
other., 278 The ultimate outcome would be war:
[A]s the final appellate power in [federal] questions is given to
this court, controversies as to the respective powers of the
United States and the States, instead of being determined by
military and physical force, are ... settled with the calmness
and deliberation of judicial inquiry. And no one can fail to see,
that if such an arbiter had not been provided ... internal tran-
quility could not have been preserved; and if such controversies
were left to the arbitrament of physical force, our Govern-
ment[s], State and National, would soon cease to be
Governments of laws, and revolutions by force of arms would
take the place of courts of justice and judicial decisions.279
The Court held the Fugitive Slave Law constitutional and reversed the
judgments of the Wisconsin court in each of the consolidated cases.
Reaction to Abelman followed a predictable pattern. The Wisconsin
court refused to enter the Supreme Court's mandates, 28' and the state
legislature passed a set of resolutions condemning the Court's exercise
of jurisdiction as "an arbitrary act of power, unauthorized by the Con-
stitution. 282 In Congress, where there had been calls for repeal of
275. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). For a discussion of Martin, see supra text accom-
panying notes 153-178.
276. Abelman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 514-25. The Court asserted that Abelman repre-
sented the first occasion in which a state supreme court had claimed supremacy with regard
to a federal question, id. at 514-an assertion which, in light of all that had gone before, was
not "wholly accurate." Warren (pt. 2), supra note 22, at 183.
277. Abelman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 514-25. For the arguments of the WTO's support-
ers, see supra text accompanying notes 111-121, 138-142.
278. Abelman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 518.
279. Id. at 520-21; see also id. at 519-20, 525.
280. Id. at 525-26. The Court also ruled that the Wisconsin court had no authority to
inquire into the proceedings of a federal court "by habeas corpus or by any other process."
Id. at 525-26 (emphasis omitted).
281. See 1 BOUDIN, supra note 22, at 481; SWISHER, supra note 263, at 670; 2 WAR-
REN, supra note 22, at 342-43.
282. Wisconsin Resolutions, March 19, 1859, in STATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 184, at
303-05; see also SWISHER, supra note 263, at 668; 2 WARREN, supra note 22, at 340-41.
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section twenty-five even while Abelman was under consideration, mem-
bers from Northern and Western states denounced the Court in strong
terms . 3 Senator Doolittle of Wisconsin, for example, ridiculed the
"'Federal doctrine of judicial supremacy'" that had appeared so promi-
nently in Taney's opinion. . Doolittle even went so far as to praise the
courts of Virginia and Georgia for having disregarded the Court's man-
dates in the past, as did Senator Hale of New Hampshire.285
Once again, though, the crisis passed. The Wisconsin resolutions,
like the Virginia resolutions that had followed Cohens v. Virginia,
2 11
failed to spark a national campaign.287 Abelman may have alerted North-
erners to the dangers of Supreme Court review, but it had caused
Southerners to reconsider their opposition. In a speech on the Senate
floor, Robert Toombs of Georgia denounced Wisconsin's "'infidelity'"
to the Constitution and criticized its assertion of supremacy over the
federal courts. In Wisconsin, federal authorities rearrested Booth, this
time placing him in a federal customs house for safekeeping.2'9 After a
drawn-out saga, which included at least one rescue and recapture, Booth
received a pardon from President James Buchanan on the day before
Abraham Lincoln's inauguration in 1861.29!
III. SOVEREIGNTY, COMPLIANCE, AND THE WTO:
LESSONS FROM AMERICAN HISTORY
Abelman represents the last serious challenge by a state court to the
idea of Supreme Court review. The Civil War, which broke out two
years later, put an end to questions about the Court's authority to review
283. See 2 WARREN, supra note 22, at 333-36, 345-48; see also CONG. GLOBE 35th
Cong., Ist Sess. 1703 (1858) (remarks of Sen. Pugh); id. app. at 72-76 (1859) (remarks of
Rep. Bliss).
284. 2 WARREN, supra note 22, at 346-47.
285. See id at 346.
286. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). For a discussion of Cohens, see supra text accom-
panying notes 179-208.
287. For a discussion of the Virginia resolutions, see supra text accompanying note
184.
288. See 2 WARREN, supra note 22, at 348-49.
289. Id. at 348.
290. See SWISHER, supra note 263, at 671.
291. See id. at 671-72; A.J. Beitzinger, Federal Law Enforcement and the Booth Cases,
41 MARQ. L. REV. 7, 32 (1957).
292. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 507 (4th ed. 1996) ("The constitutional validity of the Court's
jurisdiction to review state court decisions has not been seriously challenged in the contem-
porary era.").
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the judgments of state courts.293 There have been grumblings about the
294Court's exercise of jurisdiction in particular cases, most notably the
school desegregation cases in the 1950s,29' and resistance to particular
decisions.296 On the whole, though, the Court's authority to review the
judgments of state courts has become, since Appomattox, an accepted
feature of American jurisprudence. 297
The history of Supreme Court review has interesting implications
for today's debate on the WTO. While there are significant differences
between the two institutions-differences I discuss below-the Court
298and the WTO are alike in one essential respect. Both are centralized
tribunals that purport to decide whether constituents' laws conform to
external standards. And, just as the antebellum Court had to establish its
authority to determine whether state laws conformed to federal norms,
the WTO must establish its authority to determine whether national laws
conform to international norms. Indeed, as we have seen, the arguments
made in today's debate on the WTO greatly resemble those made earlier
299in the context of Supreme Court review.
The nineteenth-century history suggests, however, that both sides in
today's debate exaggerate the likely impact of the WTO on member
nations. To see why, one must appreciate the factors that favored estab-
lishment of Supreme Court review in early nineteenth-century America.
In its struggle to assert authority over state courts, the Court had several
advantages. To begin, the Court asserted jurisdiction under an express
statutory grant, contained in one of the first pieces of legislation that
Congress adopted.3°° As the Court's supporters repeatedly observed,
Congress conferred this authority on the Court without recorded dissent,
293. See Steve J. Boom, The European Union After the Maastricht Decision: Will
Germany Be the "Virginia of Europe?", 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 177, 199 (1995); Goldstein,
supra note 22, at 155, 166.
294. See Warren (pt. 2), supra note 22, at 185-89.
295. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see FALLON ET AL., supra
note 292, at 507; Boom, supra note 293, at 200. For examples of resolutions criticizing Su-
preme Court review in light of the Brown decision, see 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 435, 435-47
(1956).
296. Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA.
L. REV. 83, 100 (1998) (discussing "willingness of democratic institutions to resist Court
rulings" on abortion, affirmative action, school prayer and other subjects).
297. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 292, at 507; see also 16B WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 21, § 4006, at 129; cf Friedman, supra note 22, at 340-41 (discussing how disputes
about the Court's supremacy subsided following the Civil War).
298. See infra text accompanying notes 315-326 (describing differences between the
Court and WTO).
299. See, e.g. supra text accompanying notes 23-24, 209, 250, 277.
300. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87; see HAINES, supra note 22,
at 120. For the text of § 25, see supra note 150.
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and the Court exercised it without incident for roughly a quarter-
century.301
The Court asserted jurisdiction, moreover, under a constitution that
established it as part of a new national government. 2 In that context,
arguments about the need for uniformity carried great weight. The Con-
stitution granted Congress significant legislative powers, including,
among other things, the power to collect taxes, to regulate foreign and
interstate commerce, to raise armies, and to declare war.303 If state courts
could adopt independent interpretations of federal law, they could easily
frustrate these powers. 3°4 Allowing state courts to go their own way on
federal questions could, in Webster's words, render "the General Gov-
ernment ... good for nothing."35
Other circumstances also favored the establishment of Supreme
Court review. American judges and lawyers shared a common legal
culture that could have eased the integration of state and federal courts
into a unitary system.3° Americans shared a common history, the de-
fining event of which had been a successful rebellion against British
rule, an epochal struggle still in living memory.3 7 While they were not
so homogeneous as one might think,0 8 Americans in the early nine-
301. See supra note 152 (discussing early history of § 25).
302. The Constitution did not expressly grant the Court authority to review state judg-
ments, but the implication was clear. Article III gave the Court appellate jurisdiction of
"Cases ... arising under" federal law, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2, and, as Justice Story
pointed out in Martin, one could best read this language as extending to cases in state as well
as federal courts. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 327-52 (1816); see
also supra text accompanying notes 168-178 (discussing Martin).
303. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Though the Constitution granted Congress significant
powers, the Framers clearly contemplated that the federal government would have far more
limited authority than it has come to exercise in the twentieth century. See, e.g., John 0.
McGinnis, The Original Constitution and Its Decline: A Public Choice Perspective, 21
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 195, 205-06 (1997).
304. See supra text accompanying notes 174-177 (discussing views of Story), 193
(discussing views of Marshall), 230-233 (discussing views of Webster), 278 (discussing
views of Taney).
305. CONG. DEB. 78 (Jan. 27, 1830). For further discussion of Webster's views, see su-
pro text accompanying notes 230-233.
306. For good sources on this culture, see THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA (Perry Miller
ed., 1962); PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 99-265 (1965); WHITE,
supra note 153, at 76-156. The culture derived largely from English norms and practice.
Writing in 1833, Joseph Story confidently asserted that the English common law was Amer-
ica's "birthright and inheritance," the "foundation[]" for "[tihe whole structure of our
present jurisprudence." STORY, supra note 169, § 79, at 65. This was a somewhat controver-
sial claim when Story made it, see MILLER, supra, at 105, 115, 125, but his did come to be
the accepted view. See Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1519, 1524 (1997).
307. See THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 38 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
[hereinafter FEDERALIST No. 2].
308. See DONALD, supra note 226, at 5-9.
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teenth century were united, as Jay had observed in The Federalist, by
many common "manners and customs": by and large, they spoke the
same language, practiced much the same religion, and had similar po-
litical institutions.3°9 In short, early nineteenth-century Americans
possessed a sense of common identity, a fact confirmed by the surge in
nationalism that followed the War of 1812.31°
Notwithstanding all these factors, the Court found it impossible,
over a period spanning more than forty years, to assert its authority over
recalcitrant states. While states accepted the Court's judgments most of
the time, they did not hesitate to ignore them where they believed that
important state interests were at stake:'" real property and anti-lottery
laws in Virginia, 12 for example, or the administration of Indian lands in
Georgia,"3 or abolitionism in Wisconsin.14 And the WTO stands in a
much weaker position than the Court did in the early nineteenth century.
No legislation grants the WTO jurisdiction over national courts. As we
have seen, WTO rulings lack effect in national courts." Members that
fail to comply with rulings may face retaliation from aggrieved parties,
but their courts can continue to apply domestic law, whatever the WTO
decides.3 6 For domestic purposes, WTO rulings are little more than ad-
visory opinions, quite different in nature from the binding judgments
authorized by the Judiciary Act of 1789.' 7
Unlike the Court, moreover, the WTO does not act as part of a gov-
ernment that has significant regulatory responsibilities. The document
that establishes the WTO is not a constitution, but a trade treaty. It con-
fers nothing like the range of prescriptive authority that article I grants
309. FEDERALIST No. 2, supra note 307, at 38; see also JESSUP, supra note 22, at 26
(describing growing network of national economic institutions).
310. See id. at 20-33; BAILEY, supra note 227, at 222-42; cf JESSUP, supra note 22, at
25-26 (arguing that surge in nationalism following War of 1812 was short-lived).
311. See Goldstein, supra note 22, at 155-56.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 153-208 (discussing Martin v. Hunter's Les-
see, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) and Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)).
313. See supra text accompanying notes 210-225, 244-245 (discussing Cherokee
cases, particularly Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 557 (1832)).
314. See supra text accompanying notes 262-291 (discussing Abelman v. Booth, 62
U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859)).
315. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91. For purposes of the United States, this
is made clear by section 102 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which denies effect to
any GATT provision, or the application of any GATT provision, that is inconsistent with
United States law. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
317. For more on the Judiciary Act of 1789, see supra text accompanying notes
149-52.
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Congress.38 While the WTO can act in a legislative capacity in some
circumstances-for example, by adopting waivers, interpretations, or
amendments 3'9-voting procedures are "extremely cumbersome, '3 20 in-
volving various supermajority and unanimity requirements. 32  And
"secession" is always an option. Under the WTO Agreement, members
can withdraw from the organization, for any reason, on six months no-
tice.1
22
Finally, WTO members share little in the way of culture or his-
tory.3 2' To be sure, they have some common goals. Membership in the
WTO suggests a commitment to the principles of free trade, for exam-
ple. But there exists nothing like the commonality of experience and
identity that united early Americans.'2 The 134 nations that make up the
WTO-nations as diverse as Pakistan, Denmark, and the Dominican
Republic-have widely different customs, values, economies, and re-
gimes.12 As a consequence, members are likely to feel less attachment
for the WTO than states did for the Court. Members are more likely to
view WTO rulings as the pronouncements of a remote and alien institu-
318. See supra text accompanying note 303 (discussing U.S. CONST. art. I); cf Reitz,
supra note 4, at 599 (observing that WTO lacks significant legislative functions). But cf
Nichols, supra note 19, at 692 (suggesting broader scope for WTO's legislative authority).
319. See WTO Agreement art. 9(2) (adoption of interpretations), art. 9(3) (adoption of
waivers), art. 10 (adoption of amendments).
320. Shell, supra note 8, at 850.
321. The membership may adopt waivers and interpretations on a three-fourths vote.
See WTO Agreement arts. 9(2), 9(3). Amendments are adopted on a two-thirds vote, pro-
vided they do not affect members' rights and obligations. See id. art 10(1). Amendments that
affect members' rights and obligations are adopted by a two-thirds vote, but apply only to
those members who accept them, though three-fourths of the membership can decide that
members that do not accept the amendments shall be free to withdraw from the organization.
Id. art. 10(3). Certain amendments, including amendments to the DSU, must be unanimous.
Id. arts. 10(2), 10(8). For further description of these and other voting requirements, see
JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 311-13.
322. See supra text accompanying note 141; see also Perez, supra note 142, at 326
(suggesting that right to secede undercuts notion that "WTO law should be understood as a
supranational constitution").
323. See Nichols, Trade Without Values, supra note 19, at 695-96. Recently, some
commentators have asserted the existence of a global culture, based on Western, rights-
oriented ideologies and promoted by advances in telecommunication. See Mark L.
Movsesian, The Persistent Nation State and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 18 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1083, 1089 (1996) (discussing arguments); see also Lawrence M. Friedman,
Nationalism, Identity, and Law, 28 IND. L. REV. 503, 507 (1995) (discussing consumer- and
rights-consciousness as elements of an international mass culture). There is something to
this, but one can easily overestimate the impact of the new "consumerism." See Movsesian,
supra, at 1093; see also Trimble, supra note 19, at 1953-54.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 306-310.
325. For the membership of the WTO, see Members, supra note 6.
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tion, particularly given the manner in which panelists receive their ap-
pointments and the secretive nature of panel proceedings.326
Given its comparatively weak position, one would expect the WTO
to be even less successful in obtaining members' compliance than the
Court was in the early nineteenth century. In light of the American ex-
perience, it seems safe to predict that WTO members will defy adverse
rulings whenever they believe that vital national interests are at stake.
Indeed, even at this early date, when relatively few disputes have
327
reached the implementation stage, one can detect signs of resistance
In both the banana-imports and hormones disputes, the EC has declined
to change its laws in response to adverse rulings-despite rulings
authorizing retaliation by the complaining parties."2
All this is not to say that members will never implement adverse rul-
ings. Just as states did, members may decide that compliance is a sensible
strategy, much of the time: complying with an adverse ruling may serve
some long-term national interest, like encouraging cooperation from other
members, or discouraging protectionist agitation at home.329 Circum-
stances may change, moreover, in ways that render the WTO more
effective. If members decided to grant rulings direct effect in national
courts, for example, that could significantly increase the organization's
influence.3 0 As things now stand, though, the nineteenth-century history
326. On the appointment of panelists, and the secretive nature of panel proceedings, see
supra text accompanying notes 132-137.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 100-104; see also Reif & Florestal, supra note
87, at 756.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 102-104 (discussing banana-imports and hor-
mones disputes).
329. See Shell, supra note 8, at 835, 864-66 (discussing "Regime Management Model"
for WTO); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106
YALE L.J. 2599, 2632-33 (1997) (book review) (discussing states' compliance with interna-
tional norms generally); supra text accompanying notes 117-121 (discussing arguments that
DSU will promote states' compliance with international trade norms).
330. Formal authority is not the only factor that can lead to a consolidation of power in
a supranational body. Take the European Union, for example. Under the Treaty of Rome, the
European Court of Justice has authority to issue "preliminary" interpretive rulings on ques-
tions of European law that national courts refer to it. Jeffrey C. Cohen, The European
Preliminary Reference and U.S. Supreme Court Review of State Court Judgments: A Study in
Comparative Judicial Federalism, 44 AM. J. CoMp. L. 421, 423-45 (1996) (discussing article
177 of Treaty of Rome). As a formal matter, these rulings do not bind national courts. See id.
at 436. As a practical matter, though, national courts routinely comply. See id. at 426; see
also J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2420-21 (1991). As
a result, ECJ judgments have "roughly the same effect as judgments issued by domestic
courts in member states." Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of
Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 292 (1997). Despite the lack of
formal appellate authority, the ECJ has succeeded in making national courts part of "a uni-
tary system of judicial review." Weiler, supra, at 2420.
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suggests that the WTO will have a less profound impact on its member
states than the current debate implies.
CONCLUSION
The WTO's mechanism for resolving trade disputes has caused a
great deal of controversy. In some ways, this is understandable. Par-
ticularly for Americans, the notion that a supranational body might
conduct judicial proceedings and declare national laws "invalid" is a
startling one. As this article has shown, though, one can easily exagger-
ate the effect WTO rulings are likely to have on member states. It took
several decades and a civil war for the Court to establish its authority
over states of the union. If the American experience with Supreme
Court review is any guide, the WTO presently represents neither the
threat to sovereignty its critics decry, nor the advance for international
compliance its advocates anticipate.
There are reasons to doubt the usefulness of the ECJ as a model for the WTO, however.
Unlike the WTO, the EU possesses significant legislative and administrative powers.
"[T]here is important EU legislation in such fields as the environment, worker and consumer
protection, gender equality, corporate law and securities regulation, and taxation." JACKSON
ET AL., supra note 5, at 188. See generally RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW
AFTER MAASTRICHT (1996) (reviewing substantive EU law). Moreover, the commonality of
the European experience provides a context for political integration that the WTO lacks. See
Nichols, Trade Without Values, supra note 19, at 694; see also supra text accompanying
notes 323-325 (discussing lack of commonality among WTO members).
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